



INFINITE ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
DAVID HORTON† 
For decades, the Supreme Court has expanded the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) and companies have placed arbitration clauses in hundreds of millions of 
contracts. This Article examines a less-obvious way in which arbitration’s tendrils 
are growing. Once, even the broadest arbitration provisions only governed 
allegations that were somehow connected to the agreement between the parties (the 
“container contract”). As a result, they often did not cover shocking and 
unforeseeable misconduct, or parties who did not sign the container contract, or 
claims that arose after the agreement lapsed. But now businesses are experimenting 
with what this Article calls “infinite” arbitration clauses: those that mandate 
arbitration for all disputes between any related party in perpetuity. Moreover, to cut 
courts out of the loop, drafters are coupling infinite provisions with so-called 
“delegation” clauses, which give the arbitrator the exclusive right to determine 
whether to send a cause of action to arbitration. 
The Article reveals that courts are divided about whether to take infinite 
provisions literally. At first, most judges refused to allow companies to compel 
arbitration in such broad strokes. Yet the Court has recently decided a rash of cases 
that imply that the FAA overrides judicial hostility to boundless arbitration 
provisions. Thus, infinite clauses are caught in a tug-of-war between state contract 
rules that protect individuals from overreaching and the Justices’ view that the FAA 
makes arbitration agreements bulletproof. 
To resolve this conflict, the Article offers a theory about the limits of corporate 
power to opt out of the judicial system. First, it argues that some infinite provisions 
are not valid because they attempt to impose arbitration on plaintiffs who did not 
truly agree to the process. Second, it contends that even when a plaintiff did agree 
to arbitrate, the robust federal policy in favor of arbitration does not apply to lawsuits 
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that have no logical relationship to the container contract. Finally, the Article uses 
these insights to propose solutions to the numerous problems raised by ultra-broad 
arbitration clauses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Diana Mey added her name to her husband’s AT&T Mobility 
wireless account.1 To complete the transaction, she signed Mobility’s 
Customer Agreement on an electronic pad at the cashier’s counter.2 
Mobility’s fine print contained an arbitration clause that applied to “all 
disputes” between Mey and Mobility’s “subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, 
employees, predecessors in interest, successors, and assigns.”3 
Three years later, AT&T, Inc., Mobility’s parent company, acquired 
DIRECTV Group Holdings, DIRECTV’s parent company.4 Thus, Mobility 
and DIRECTV became “corporate cousins at least seven times removed.”5 
In 2017, DIRECTV made obnoxious telemarketing calls to Mey’s cell 
phone.6 Mey, whose number was on the Do Not Call Registry, sued DIRECTV 
for violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).7 DIRECTV 
 
1 Brief of Appellee at 5, Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 18-1534 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018), 2018 
WL 4098110 [hereinafter Mey Appellee’s Brief]. 
2 Id. at 1, 5. 
3 Corrected Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant DIRECTV, LLC at 7, Mey, No. 18-1534 
(4th Cir. July 19, 2018), 2018 WL 3610508 [hereinafter Mey Opening Brief] (emphasis omitted). 
4 Mey Appellee’s Brief, supra note 1, at 6. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1. 
7 Id. 
2020] Infinite Arbitration Clauses 635
responded by moving to compel arbitration.8 DIRECTV did not contend that 
Mey had ever been a DIRECTV customer or that there was any agreement 
between itself and Mey.9 Instead, DIRECTV argued that because it was an 
“affiliate” of Mobility, it was entitled to invoke the arbitration provision in the 
contract that Mey had formed with Mobility in 2012.10 
 
Figure 1: AT&T’s Corporate Structure11 
*      *      * 
Michelle Haasbroek was a skincare specialist for Steiner Transocean in the 
spa on board a cruise ship.12 One night, when Haasbroek was off-duty, she was 
raped and impregnated by a coworker.13 Haasbroek sued Steiner for failing to 
insure her safety, for mistreating her after she reported the incident, and for 
wrongful birth.14 The company sought to enforce the arbitration clause in her 
8 See Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 17-00179, 2018 WL 7823097, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 25, 
2018) (denying a motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation).
9 Mey Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
10 Id. 
11 Mey Appellee’s Brief, supra note 1, at 7. 
12 Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2017). 
13 Id. at 1355, 1358. 
14 Id.
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employment contract.15 As Steiner noted, even though Haasbroek’s allegations 
were disturbing, she had agreed to arbitrate “[a]ny and all disputes, claims or 
controversies whatsoever . . . [including] failure to provide prompt, proper 
and adequate medical care, personal injury, [or] death.”16 
*      *      * 
In March 2012, Kaylee Heffelfinger opened a checking and a savings 
account with Wells Fargo Bank.17 She filled out and signed an application.18 
 
 
Unbeknownst to Heffelfinger, she was already a Wells Fargo customer.19
Three months earlier, before she had ever contacted the bank, its employees 




Then, in October 2012, Wells Fargo personnel created two more bogus 
accounts in her name.21 This time, the application contained no signature at all.22
15 Id. at 1356. 
16 Id. at 1355. 
17 Consolidated Amended Complaint Class Action ¶ 64, Jabarri v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2015
WL 13699809 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (No. 15-02159) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. ¶ 65.
20 Id. 
21 Id. ¶ 66. 
22 Id.
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Over the next two years, these sham accounts began to accrue unpaid 
fees.23 By the time Heffelfinger discovered the fraud, collection agencies were 
hounding her and her credit score had been ruined.24 
Heffelfinger’s experience was not unique. In 2016, Wells Fargo admitted 
that its employees had generated 3,500,000 fake accounts in the names of 
more than 2,000,000 real people.25 The institution faced a torrent of criticism 
and scrutiny from lawmakers,26 consumer watchdogs,27 and journalists.28 It 
pushed out its CEO,29 entered into a $105 million consent decree with the 
23 Id. ¶¶ 67-69.
24 Id. ¶¶ 68, 78. 
25 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, 2016 WL 6646128, ¶¶ 16, 23 (Sept. 4, 
2016) (estimating that the bank had opened 1,534,280 counterfeit deposit accounts and issued 565,443
phantom credit cards); Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo’s Sales-Scandal Tally Grows to Around 3.5 Million Accounts, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-sales-scandal-tally-
grows-to-around-3-5-million-accounts-1504184598 [https://perma.cc/BH4F-QCHC] (noting that the 
bank later conceded that the “scandal was far broader than it had previously acknowledged”). 
26 See, e.g., Renae Merle, Warren to Wells Fargo CEO: ‘You Should Be Fired,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/10/03/ceo-to-congress-wells-fargo-is-
better-bank-today-than-it-was-a-year-ago/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8df449423c7b [https://perma.
cc/H8NR-833N] (describing heated exchanges between Wells Fargo’s then-chief executive, Timothy 
Sloan, and members of the Senate Banking Committee).
27 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Wells Fargo’s Testimony Left Some Feeling Shortchanged, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business/wells-fargo-testimony.html 
[https://perma.cc/V97G-QQTV] (“Led by Americans for Financial Reform and Public 
Citizen . . . the groups sent a letter late Thursday to leadership of the Senate Banking Committee 
and the House Financial Services Committee urging them to bring Wells Fargo executives back to 
Capitol Hill to answer questions about the bank’s stream of abuses.”).
28 See Emily Glazer et al., Wells Fargo Is Trying to Fix Its Rogue Account Scandal, One Grueling 
Case at a Time, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016, 11:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-is-
trying-to-fix-its-rogue-account-scandal-one-grueling-case-at-a-time-1482855852 [https://perma.cc/
Y9Y8-M9ZL] (profiling widespread frustrations with Wells Fargo’s cleanup process following the 
account scandal). 
29 See Matt Egan, Jackie Wattles & Cristina Alesci, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf is Out, CNN
(Oct. 12, 2016, 7:31 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/12/investing/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-
retires/index.html [https://perma.cc/78XM-YUV3] (“Stumpf made the decision to retire, which was 
welcomed by the board.”).
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,30 and agreed to pay a total of $575 
million in fines to states.31 
But because Wells Fargo’s remedial efforts did not make all of its 
customers whole, Heffelfinger filed a class action in federal court.32 Here the 
bank had an ace up its sleeve. When Heffelfinger had applied for her 
legitimate accounts in March 2012, she had agreed to the bank’s Consumer 
Account Agreement.33 This contract mandated arbitration for “any 
unresolved disagreement between you and the Bank,” including those “about 
the meaning, application or enforceability of this arbitration agreement.”34 
Citing this language, Wells Fargo did not just argue that Heffelfinger had 
agreed to arbitrate the merits of her lawsuit; rather, the firm contended that 
Heffelfinger had agreed to arbitrate the very question of whether she had 
agreed to arbitrate the merits of her lawsuit.35 
*      *      * 
Forced arbitration is a hallmark of the modern American civil justice 
system. In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to 
abolish ancient rules that made predispute arbitration clauses 
unenforceable.36 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the 
statute, provoking debate about whether private dispute resolution was an 
elegant alternative to the pathologies of litigation37 or “do-it-yourself tort 
 
30 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, 2016 WL 6646128, at ¶¶ 49, 57 
(Sept. 4, 2016) (requiring that Wells Fargo pay $5 million in “redress to [a]ffected [c]onsumers” and 
$100 million directly to the Bureau as a “civil money penalty”). 
31 Annalyn Kurtz, Wells Fargo is Paying $575 Million to States to Settle Fake Account Claims, CNN 
BUSINESS (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/28/business/wells-fargo-settlement/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/82AW-RW9D]. 
32 Class Action Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 84, 92-142. 
33 Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Kaylee 
Heffelfinger’s Claims at 1, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2015 WL 13699809 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 
2015) (No. 15-02159) [hereinafter “Heffelfinger Motion to Compel”]. 
34 Id. at 3. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35 Id. at 7-8. 
36 See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2018)) (making arbitration agreements valid and enforceable in federal court); 
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (noting that the FAA was intended to overcome “the 
[anachronistic] jealousy of the . . . courts” that “refused to enforce specific agreements to 
arbitrate . . .”); Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial 
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th 
Cong. 2 (1923) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, 
Arbitration Committee, New York Chamber of Commerce) (“The fundamental conception 
underlying the law is to make arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”). 
37 See, e.g., Steven A. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, ABA J., Feb. 1985, at 78, 79 
(explaining that arbitration proponents believe that it is “faster, less costly and more private, 
informal and confidential than litigation . . .”). 
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reform.”38 Since 2010, the Justices have gone further, issuing a rash of 
opinions that have encouraged businesses to use arbitration as a shield against 
class actions.39 Not surprisingly, studies have found arbitration clauses in 
millions of consumer and employment contracts.40 
This Article identifies a subtler way in which arbitration’s shadow is 
growing. Traditionally, companies only attempted to mandate arbitration of 
disputes that were connected to the contract that included the arbitration 
provision (the “container contract”). Thus, until recently, even the broadest 
arbitration clause only applied to “any controversy or claim . . . arising out of 
or relating to this agreement.”41 Now, however, drafters have become more 
ambitious. In rising numbers, they have started to experiment with what I 
call “infinite” arbitration agreements. 
Infinite arbitration clauses exhibit one or more of the following 
characteristics. First, they are “not limited to disputes arising from or related 
to the transaction or contract at issue.”42 For instance, Wells Fargo’s customers 
agree to arbitrate “[a]ny unresolved disagreement,”43 and Steiner’s arbitration 
clause covers “all disputes, claims or controversies whatsoever.”44 Thus, 
infinite provisions attempt to govern conduct that has nothing to do with the 
original transaction, such as sexual harassment after the purchase of 
household goods45 or “a punch in the nose during a dispute over medical 
 
38 Ragan v. AT & T Corp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1193 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
39 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that the FAA 
preempts a state rule that deemed most class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts to be 
unconscionable); see also, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (reversing the 
National Labor Relations Board’s decision outlawing class arbitration waivers in employment 
contracts); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2013) (extending 
Concepcion to a similar federal common law rule that often invalidated class arbitration waivers). 
40 See, e.g., CFPB Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 10, 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_ 
arbitration-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7CT-HJ52] (reporting that “tens of millions of consumers are 
covered by arbitration clauses”); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Access to the Courts is Now Barred for More than 60 
Million American Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the- 
growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-
american-workers/ [https://perma.cc/YW7W-CPTN] (estimating that 60.1 million American workers 
are subject to mandatory employment arbitration procedures). 
41 Mehler v. Terminix Int’l Co., No. 397-2390, 1998 WL 893149, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 
1998) (referring to such a provision as “the paradigm of a broad arbitration clause”), rev’d, 205 F.3d 
44 (2d Cir. 2000). 
42 In re Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., Text Spam Litig., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
43 Heffelfinger Motion to Compel, supra note 33, at 3 (emphasis added). 
44 Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2017) 
(emphasis added). 
45 See Parm v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 15-3437, 2017 WL 1193993, at *9 n.20 (D. Minn. Mar. 
30, 2017) (theorizing that a bank’s arbitration agreement for credit account holders would not apply 
to an instance of sexual harassment between employees even if one of the employees was a credit 
account holder of the same bank), rev’d and remanded, 898 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2018). 
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billing.”46 Second, infinite clauses extend beyond the original contractual 
partners. Like Mobility’s Customer Agreement—which applies to the parties’ 
“subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, employees, predecessors in interest, 
successors, and assigns, as well as all authorized or unauthorized users”—
infinite clauses govern all persons or entities with a connection to the 
container contract.47 Third, infinite provisions have no sunset date. Although 
the common law condemns perpetual contracts, infinite clauses “survive the 
closing of [an] account or termination of any service.”48 Finally, infinite 
clauses often appear alongside what the Supreme Court has dubbed 
“delegation clauses”: terms that give the arbitrator the exclusive right to 
decide gateway questions of “arbitrability” (whether a claim must be 
submitted to arbitration). That is, under contracts like Wells Fargo’s, a 
plaintiff must participate in the arbitration process in order to argue that her 
complaint falls outside the boundaries of the arbitration clause.49 Infinite 
clauses stretch to the horizon and last forever. They are less a contractual 
provision and more a kind of arbitration servitude. 
The Article begins by exploring the roots of this phenomenon. It reveals 
that infinite provisions are the byproduct of a neglected area of doctrinal 
confusion. Although no law review article has addressed the topic,50 courts 
have long struggled with “scope arbitrability”: whether an arbitration clause 
applies to a specific claim.51 To be sure, the classic “broad” arbitration 
 
46 Med. Staff of Doctors Med. Ctr. v. Kamil, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 857 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(reasoning that, much like a physical assault in a billing dispute, an arbitration agreement covering 
medical care would not extend to deliberate destruction of physicians’ professional relationships). 
47 Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomer 
Agreement.html#disputeResolutionByBindingArb [https://perma.cc/DY8T-XWKT] (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2020). 
48 WELLS FARGO, DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENT 8 (2019), https://www.wellsfargo.com/ 
fetch-pdf?formNumber=CCB2018C&subProductCode=ANY [https://perma.cc/H3CG-6F8X]. 
49 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010). 
50 Cf. Stephen E. Friedman, The Lost Controversy Limitation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1005 (2012). Friedman’s excellent but overlooked article argues that broad 
arbitration clauses (which govern claims that “arise out of or relate to” the container contract) 
exceed the scope of the FAA (which only covers allegations that “aris[e] out of ” the underlying 
agreement). Id. at 1006. As will become apparent in Section II.A, my thesis builds on Friedman’s 
insight. However, my Article differs from Friedman’s in several important ways. First, and most 
importantly, Friedman does not address infinite arbitration clauses. Second, Friedman simply 
assumes that courts “invariably enforce . . . broad [arbitration] provisions.” Id. at 1007. Conversely, 
I show that the law is not nearly so clear. Third, Friedman uses his descriptive argument to claim 
that the FAA “appl[ies] only to the arbitration of contract disputes.” Id. at 1037. In contrast, I 
contend that the statute does not impose any bright-line requirements on the kinds of causes of 
action that can be arbitrated; rather, it merely insists that an allegation have a nexus with the 
container contract. See infra Section II.B. 
51 King v. Cintas Corp., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“[C]ourts have not 
provided unified authority on the scope of arbitration clauses.”). 
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provision casts a wide net.52 If a plaintiff sues for breach of contract, wrongful 
firing, employment discrimination, or violation of consumer protection laws, 
her allegations “arise out of or relate to” the container contract and therefore 
trigger its arbitration agreement.53 However, in other cases, the link between 
the complaint and the container contract is less clear. As the Tenth Circuit 
once mused, what if “two small business owners execute a sales contract 
including a[n] . . . arbitration clause, and one assaults the other”?54 Because 
of the mutability of phrases like “arise out of” and “relate to,” there is no easy 
answer. Compounding this problem, scope arbitrability occupies “a gray space 
of overlapping federal arbitration and state contract law.”55 Although the 
Court has declared that arbitration clauses must be “generously construed as 
to issues of arbitrability,”56 contract doctrine cuts the other way by nullifying 
unconscionable terms, vindicating an individual’s reasonable expectations, 
and construing ambiguities against the drafter.57 Thus, courts disagree about 
whether to compel arbitration of claims that seek relief for shocking 
misconduct, or that are filed by or against nonsignatories, or that are brought 
after the container contract has lapsed.58 In turn, corporations have 
engineered infinite provisions to try to fill these gaps. 
Infinite clauses have further divided the few judges that have confronted 
them. Although there is “almost no case law addressing such broad arbitration 
clauses,”59 some courts view them skeptically. For example, in Diane Mey’s 
lawsuit, a federal judge in West Virginia refused to allow DIRECTV to 
piggyback on Mobility’s arbitration clause.60 The court explained that reading 
the provision literally could spawn absurd results: 
If [the plaintiff] were hit by a Mobility delivery van, or if she tripped over a 
dangerous condition in a Mobility store, her tort claim would have to go to 
arbitration. If she bought shares of stock in Mobility and later claimed a decrease 
in share price was the result of corporate malfeasance, her securities-fraud claim 
would have to go to arbitration. And since the arbitration clause purports to 
survive termination of the underlying service agreement, this obligation to 
arbitrate any claim whatsoever against Mobility would last forever.61 
 
52 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
53 See infra text accompanying notes 142–144. 
54 Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995). 
55 Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1279 (D. Utah 2017). 
56 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). 
57 See infra text accompanying notes 123–127. 
58 See generally infra text accompanying notes 144–168. 
59 Wexler v. AT & T Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 500, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
60 Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 17-00179, 2018 WL 7823097, at *5 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 25, 2018). 
61 Id. at *6 (citing Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 502-03). 
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Accordingly, the court held that the language was “unconscionably 
overbroad.”62 In the same vein, other courts have refused to apply infinite 
provisions to unforeseeable and outrageous conduct.63 
But this jaundiced view of infinite clauses is hard to square with the Court’s 
recent FAA decisions. These opinions admonish lower courts to “‘rigorously 
enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms”64 and to ignore any 
rule that “discriminat[es] on its face against arbitration.”65 Taking these 
instructions to heart, some judges have held that there is nothing sinister about 
a “clause that requires arbitration of all disputes between the parties.”66 For 
instance, a federal judge in Florida compelled arbitration of Michelle 
Haasbroek’s sexual assault claims.67 Haasbroek asserted that her allegations 
were unrelated to her employment contract because the attack occurred while 
“she was off-duty and in a residential area of the ship.”68 Yet because the 
arbitration provision extended beyond “claims arising from, or relating to, 
employment,” the court held that this argument was “irrelevant.”69 
Meanwhile, the spread of delegation clauses is further muddying the 
waters. Together, delegation provisions and infinite arbitration clauses almost 
completely strip courts of jurisdiction over a company. Consider the fate of 
Heffelfinger’s class action against Wells Fargo. A federal judge in California 
expressed doubts that the bank’s arbitration clause governed Heffelfinger’s 
allegations relating to the forged January 2012 accounts.70 As the court noted, 
because Heffelfinger did not open a legitimate account until March 2012, these 
claims “may have arisen before she had any voluntary involvement with Wells 
Fargo.”71 Yet citing the delegation clause, the judge held that the arbitrator 
 
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of S.C., 644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (S.C. 2007); cf. McBride v. St. 
Anthony Messenger Magazine, No. 02-237, 2003 WL 1903381, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2003) (opining 
that, in general, “it may be unreasonable to understand the parties as intending that any dispute that 
may arise between them even if unrelated to the Agreement would be subject to arbitration”). 
64 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013). 
65 Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017). 
66 Citi Cars, Inc. v. Cox Enters., Inc., No. 17-22190, 2018 WL 1521770, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 
2018) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of City of Delray Beach Police & Firefighters Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup Glob. 
Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
67 Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2017). 
68 Id. at 1358. 
69 Id. at 1360 n.8. 
70 See Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 15-02159, 2015 WL 13699809, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
23, 2015) (in an order granting defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, noting that the issue is a 
“close question” and that “it’s difficult to imagine that this aspect of the dispute would be subject to 
the arbitration provision”). 
71 Id. at *3. 
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should decide whether Heffelfinger’s allegations fell within the scope of the 
arbitration provision.72 
Against this backdrop, the Article offers a descriptive and normative 
theory about the limits of infinite clauses. It identifies two situations in which 
judges can ignore extraordinarily broad arbitration provisions. First, some 
infinite clauses fail because they try to create contractual consent out of whole 
cloth. For example, drafters often declare that their arbitration provisions 
benefit and bind a range of nonsignatories, from their litigation allies to the 
plaintiff ’s relatives to anyone who uses a particular product or service.73 But 
absent unusual circumstances, these people and entities have nothing to do 
with the container contract. Accordingly, no matter what an arbitration clause 
says, “federal law does not force arbitration upon a party that never agreed to 
arbitrate in the first place.”74 
Second, the Article argues that another check on infinite clauses is hiding 
in plain sight. Section 2, the FAA’s centerpiece, instructs courts to enforce a 
provision “in any . . . contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract.”75 Thus, the statute imposes what I call the 
“contractual nexus” requirement: it only governs disputes that are tied to in 
some meaningful way to the parties’ agreement. 
This boundary was no accident. Congress modeled the FAA on New York’s 
pioneering 1920 arbitration statute.76 However, New York’s version of § 2 
applied across the board to any lawsuit “arising between the parties to the 
contract.”77 In contrast, federal lawmakers chose to narrow the FAA to cases 
that were tethered to the container contract. Likewise, one draft of the FAA 
applied to any controversies that were merely grounded in the parties’ general 
“transaction[s].”78 Yet Congress ultimately deleted this phrase, reinforcing the 
necessity of a contractual nexus.79 Therefore, because the FAA’s vigorous pro-
arbitration policies often do not apply to ultra-broad arbitration clauses, courts 
can continue to find that they are unconscionable, construe them against the 
drafter, or hold that they exceed a person’s reasonable expectations. 
This thesis justifies some opinions and might change the outcomes in 
others. Recall DIRECTV’s attempt to freeride on Mobility’s contract in 
 
72 See id. (holding that Wells Fargo’s argument that the dispute fell “within the scope of the 
arbitration provision” was not “wholly groundless”). 
73 See infra text accompanying notes 185–186. 
74 Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 201 (6th Cir. 2016). 
75 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (emphasis added). 
76 See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (noting that the FAA “follows the lines of the New York 
arbitration law enacted in 1920”). 
77 In re Shima & Co., 186 N.Y.S. 154, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (quoting Arbitration Law, ch. 275, § 2, 
1920 N.Y. Laws 5, 8) (emphasis added). 
78 Senate Hearings, supra note 36. 
79 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
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Mey’s lawsuit.80 The problem with this gambit is that although Mey agreed 
to arbitrate future claims against Mobility, she did not agree to arbitrate any 
claims against DIRECTV. To be sure, the common law sometimes estops 
plaintiffs from avoiding arbitration when they assert claims against 
nonsignatories who are closely related to a signatory.81 But the basis of this 
rule—that the plaintiff must have understood that she was consenting to 
arbitrate against these corporate siblings82—does not apply to two entities 
that were rivals at the time of contracting. Accordingly, the West Virginia 
federal court correctly held that DIRECTV could not enforce Mobility’s 
clause.83 Conversely, the Florida judge in Michelle Haasbroek’s case should 
have taken Haasbroek’s argument that her rape claims were unconnected to 
her employment contract more seriously.84 If Haasbroek’s allegations did not 
“aris[e] out of” the container contract, then they did not fall within the scope 
of § 2. As a result, the FAA did not apply, and the court was free to find that 
a clause cannot require arbitration for a lawsuit stemming from events outside 
of a plaintiff ’s employment.85 
Finally, the Article’s proposals inform the intersection of infinite 
arbitration clauses and delegation provisions.86 These clauses are a potent 
duo: one demands arbitration for any conceivable claim while the other sends 
disputes about arbitration to arbitration. Moreover, in January 2019, the Court 
decided Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., which further 
insulated delegation clauses from judicial oversight.87 Henry Schein overruled 
a line of precedent dating back to the 1950s that allowed courts to ignore 
delegation clauses when a defendant’s assertion that a claim fell within the 
scope of an arbitration agreement was “wholly groundless.”88 Nevertheless, 
despite the Court’s opinion, the Article’s analysis elucidates that delegation 
 
80 See supra text accompanying notes 1–11. 
81 See infra text accompanying notes 318–324. 
82 See infra text accompanying notes 326–327. 
83 See supra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. 
85 Cf. Arnold v. Burger King, 48 N.E.3d 69, 72-73 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (refusing to compel 
arbitration of workplace rape claims in a situation analogous to Haasbroek’s because the claims were 
outside the scope of the arbitration agreement). 
86 This Article’s discussion of delegation clauses builds off of two previous pieces. First, I have 
criticized the Court’s view that delegation provisions should be treated exactly like agreements to 
arbitrate the merits of a dispute. See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
363, 413 (2018). Second, I have demonstrated that arbitrators are more likely than judges to interpret 
arbitration clauses to permit class proceedings—a result that is troubling because it suggests that 
arbitrators are guided by their financial incentive to christen a long and lucrative dispute. See David 
Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L.J. 1323, 
1382 (2019). 
87 139 S. Ct. 524, 528-29 (2019). 
88 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 107–109. 
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clauses have limits. Specifically, when a plaintiff argues that she did not agree 
to arbitrate or that the arbitration clause has expired, no amount of boilerplate 
can assign this question to the arbitrator. Indeed, because arbitration draws 
its legitimacy from the parties’ consent, allowing an arbitrator to decide 
whether the parties consented (or whether their consent is still operational) 
would be an illogical circle. 
The Article contains two Parts. Part I provides background. It explains that 
courts have struggled to decide whether certain lawsuits fall within the scope 
of an arbitration clause. It then shows how businesses responded to this 
doctrinal uncertainty by creating infinite provisions. Part II identifies two ways 
in which courts can regulate infinite clauses. It asserts that infinite provisions 
can neither produce contractual assent by ipse dixit nor govern disputes that are 
unrelated to the container contract. Finally, it uses these insights to suggest 
answers to the puzzles raised by ultra-broad arbitration agreements. 
I. SCOPE WARS 
This Part begins by revealing that judges disagree about how far 
arbitration provisions can stretch. It then demonstrates that companies have 
started trying to navigate around this doctrinal fog by dramatically expanding 
their agreements to arbitrate. Finally, it describes the looming showdown 
between the judges that have pushed back against infinite clauses and the 
Court’s muscular interpretation of the FAA. 
A. Conventional Arbitration Clauses 
“Scope arbitrability”—the question of whether a dispute falls within the 
coverage of an arbitration clause—has long been “an issue about which courts 
disagree.”89 This Section describes why the topic is so challenging. 
The conventional story about the rise of the FAA begins with the 
proposition that courts were once cynical about arbitration. As is well-known, 
the common law contained special rules, known as the “ouster” and 
“revocability” doctrines, which made it hard to obtain specific performance 
of a predispute arbitration agreement.90 These measures reflected the fear 
 
89 Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 240 (5th Cir. 2009). 
90 Under the ouster doctrine, judges refused to allow private parties to contract around a court’s 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (KB) 532 (“[B]ut the agreement of the 
parties cannot oust this Court.”). The revocability rule permitted a party to withdraw its assent to 
arbitrate at any time before the arbitrator issued an award. See, e.g., Vynior’s Case (1609) 77 Eng. 
Rep. 597 (KB) 597 (“Where a man is bound by bond to stand to, abide by, and perform . . . the award 
of an arbitrator, he may countermand the authority of the arbitrator.”). 
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that extrajudicial tribunals were “instrument[s] of injustice” that “deprive[d] 
parties of rights.”91 
Nevertheless, during this period, judges actually favored arbitration in one 
way. Merchants and members of trade associations often submitted existing 
disputes to arbitration.92 After the hearing, the losing party sometimes asked 
a court to vacate the award on the grounds the arbitrator had “exceeded [her] 
powers” by ruling on a matter that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate.93 
Courts did not look kindly on these attempts to rekindle a dormant dispute. 
Indeed, they required “the party complaining [to] clearly show that the 
authority granted [under the agreement to arbitrate] has been exceeded.”94 
As the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized in 1911, this approach 
meant that the common law “put a[] liberal and comprehensive construction” 
on contracts to arbitrate.95 
In 1925, this practice became less anomalous when Congress passed the 
FAA.96 Section 2 of the statute sweeps away the cobwebs of the common law 
by making predispute arbitration clauses specifically enforceable: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.97 
By doing so, lawmakers attempted to place arbitration clauses “upon the 
same footing as other contracts.”98 But as commentators would eventually 
 
91 Tobey v. Cty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). In 
addition, arbitration may have been “seen as an economic threat to English judges, whose incomes 
often depended on fees from disputants.” Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action 
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 600 (1997). 
92 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 971-72 (1999) (noting that arbitration systems in the early 
twentieth century in the United States typically “utilized a panel of arbitrators drawn from the trade 
association’s membership and counseled the arbitrators to apply their knowledge of the trade to 
bring about an equitable resolution to the dispute.” (footnotes omitted)). 
93 Bethea v. Hood, 9 La. Ann. 88, 89 (1854). 
94 Republic of Colombia v. Cauca Co., 106 F. 337, 349 (C.C.D. W. Va. 1901), aff ’d, 113 F. 1020 
(4th Cir. 1902), rev’d, 190 U.S. 524 (1903); cf. Leslie v. Leslie, 24 A. 319, 321 (N.J. Ch. 1892) (“[I]t 
has become a settled principle of jurisprudence that awards are to be expounded favorably, and every 
reasonable intendment made in their support.”). 
95 Robertson & Creed v. Marshall, 71 S.E. 67, 68 (N.C. 1911); see also Bush v. Davis, 34 Mich. 
190, 198 (1876) (“[T]he award shall be presumed within the submission unless the contrary expressly 
appears.”); Hinkle v. Harris, 34 Mo. App. 223, 224 (Ct. App. 1889) (“The presumption is that the 
arbitrators did not exceed the powers given them . . . .”). 
96 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2018). 
97 Id. § 2. 
98 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
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recognize, § 2’s mix of state and federal law “invite[s] trouble.”99 On one hand, 
the FAA requires arbitration agreements to comply with rules that govern 
“any contract,”100 and thus makes state law the touchstone for determining 
arbitrability. On the other hand, the statute partially federalizes the same 
issue by eclipsing any rule that resurrects the ouster and revocability doctrines 
by expressing suspicion of arbitration. 
Then, after the FAA’s enactment, three points crystallized about 
interpreting arbitration provisions. First, even the broadest clause could not 
cover the elementary question of whether the parties had consented to 
arbitrate in the first place.101 Because arbitration stems from agreement, 
allowing arbitrators to rule on this issue would be a spectacular exercise in 
bootstrapping. In addition, if an arbitrator determined that a litigant did not 
assent to arbitrate, she would paradoxically undercut her own authority to 
render any judgment at all.102 
Second, when a plaintiff argued that one of her claims fell outside the 
ambit of the clause, the presumption was that courts, not arbitrators, resolved 
 
99 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of 
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1489 (2008). 
100 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (“[A]n agreement . . . to submit to arbitration . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”). 
101 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(“The [FAA] does not cover an arbitration agreement sufficiently broad to include a controversy as 
to the existence of the very contract which embodies the arbitration agreement.”). This point 
requires some elaboration. Under what is known as the “separability doctrine,” every contract that 
contains an arbitration provision is, in fact, two contracts: the container contract and the agreement 
to arbitrate. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006). Thus, 
when a party asserts a defense to enforcement of the container contract such as duress, she has not 
challenged the enforceability of the arbitration provision, which kicks in and sends the claim to 
arbitration. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) 
(holding that if the container contract contains an arbitration clause, an arbitrator should decide a 
party’s assertion that the container contract was induced by fraud). Although separability remains 
hazy, it can be understood as a default rule that assumes that parties who have assented to a contract 
containing an arbitration clause intend to have the arbitrator resolve all conflict between them, 
including disputes over whether their seeming consent to the container contract is authentic. See 
Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple 
Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 29 (2003). Yet because arbitration agreements cannot validate 
themselves, this logic does not apply when a party argues that she never truly agreed to arbitrate. For 
example, courts—not arbitrators—enjoy jurisdiction over issues such as (1) “[container] contract 
formation,” Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296 (2010); (2) lack of mental 
capacity, Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003); and (3) fraud in the factum (where a 
party misled another about whether she was entering into a contract), Sightler v. Remington Coll., 
No. 15-273-37, 2015 WL 4459545, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2015). 
102 Cf. Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 986 (“If the issue of the existence of the [container 
contract] were left to the arbitrators and they found that it was never made, they would, unavoidably 
(unless they were insane), be obliged to conclude that the arbitration agreement had never been made.”). 
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the issue.103 In fields such as maritime and labor law, judges and scholars had 
opined that it might be possible—as counterintuitive as it sounds—for 
litigants to agree to arbitrate the issue of whether an arbitration clause applied 
to a specific cause of action.104 This practice, which acquired the migraine-
inducing nickname of “arbitrating arbitrability,” capitalized on the fact that 
arbitrators are often industry insiders and therefore can bring their expertise 
to bear on the task of contract interpretation.105 Nevertheless, a contract 
needed to be explicit in order to entrust scope arbitrability to the arbitrator.106 
As the Court later explained, judges “should not assume that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ 
evidence that they did so.”107 
Third, even when this “clear and unmistakable” test was satisfied, some 
judges refused to allow arbitrators to hear claims of scope arbitrability that 
were “wholly groundless.”108 Suppose an arbitration clause (1) exempted 
intentional tort claims and also (2) empowered the arbitrator to decide 
matters of scope arbitrability. If the plaintiff then sued for intentional torts 
and the defendant moved to compel arbitration, a judge might refuse to 
submit the arbitrability question to arbitration.109 Doing so prevented the 
 
103 Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA require courts to ensure that the parties entered into a valid 
agreement to arbitrate that covers the plaintiffs’ claims. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2018) (allowing courts to 
stay litigation pending the outcome of arbitration only if they are “satisfied” that the matter “is 
referable to arbitration”); id. § 4 (tasking courts with resolving “issue[s]” about “the making of the 
arbitration agreement”); see also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 
(1986) (“[W]hether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must 
arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court.” (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964)). 
104 See Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645 v. Torrington Co., 358 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 
1966) (asserting that “the parties may voluntarily submit arbitrability to an arbitrator” where there 
is a “clear demonstration” of the parties’ intent “to have an arbitrator decide arbitrability” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Eugene F. Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on 
Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 616, 623 (1950) (“[T]here appears no reason why the parties 
may not submit the issue of arbitrability to arbitration.”). 
105 See Local No. 149 of Am. Fed’n of Tech. Eng’rs (AFL) v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 926 
(1st Cir. 1957) (noting that in the context of the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, 
“an arbitrator has certain advantages over a court”). 
106 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigations Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 
(1960) (opining that a litigant must “clear[ly] demonstrat[e]” that a collective bargaining agreement 
“excluded from court determination . . . the question of [the dispute’s] arbitrability”); Lehigh Coal 
& Navigation Co. v. Cent. R.R. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 362, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (noting that the courts 
“d[id] not readily infer such an agreement” (quoting WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 144-45 (1930))). 
107 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting AT&T Techs., 
Inc., 475 U.S. at 649). 
108 McCarroll v. L.A. Cty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d 322, 333 (Cal. 1957) 
(addressing the court’s “threshold determination of arbitrability”). 
109 Cf. Local 205, United Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 
85, 101 (1st Cir. 1956) (requiring that “the applicant’s claim of arbitrability [not be] frivolous or 
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parties from wasting their time arbitrating a frivolous assertion that a cause 
of action fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.110 
But scope arbitrability became more complex near the end of the twentieth 
century. Worried that the judiciary was buckling under the weight of the so-
called “litigation explosion,”111 the Court began to expand the FAA. In 
Southland v. Keating, the Justices held that § 2 of the statute preempts state 
law.112 Shortly thereafter, the Court invalidated a Montana law that required 
arbitration clauses to be conspicuous,113 California legislation that exempted 
wage disputes from arbitration,114 and an Alabama rule that precluded specific 
performance of an arbitration clause.115 The Court reasoned that because the 
FAA sought to abolish hostility to arbitration, states can neither “singl[e] out 
arbitration provisions for suspect status”116 nor pass “laws applicable only to 
arbitration provisions.”117 Banks, credit card issuers, employers, retailers, and 
service providers began to recognize the benefits of creating their own dispute 
resolution schemes.118 Forced arbitration clauses became a routine part of 
consumer and employment contracts, provoking heated debate about the 
privatization of the justice system.119 
 
patently baseless” before sending the issue of arbitrability to an arbitrator), aff ’d on other grounds, 353 
U.S. 547 (1957). 
110 See Am. Stores Co. v. Johnston, 171 F. Supp. 275, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (“When it appears 
that a claim of arbitrability is frivolous or patently baseless it would . . . defeat the contractual intent 
of the parties to compel arbitration.”). 
111 Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think 
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5-6 (1983) 
(collecting assertions by commentators that American society has become more litigious). 
112 465 U.S. 1, 8 (1984). 
113 See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“Montana’s [statute] directly 
conflicts with § 2 of the FAA because the State’s law conditions the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally. 
The FAA thus displaces the Montana statute . . . .”). 
114 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (“This clear federal policy places § 2 of the 
Act in unmistakable conflict with California’s [statutory] requirement that litigants be provided a 
judicial forum for resolving wage disputes. Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the state statute 
must give way.”). 
115 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (noting that “the Federal 
Arbitration Act preempts state law” because “Congress would not have wanted state and federal 
courts to reach different outcomes about the validity of arbitration in similar cases”). 
116 Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687. 
117 Id. 
118 Companies went to great lengths to try to foist arbitration upon both new and existing 
customers. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (featuring an 
arbitration clause that was placed in a shipping container); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
273, 275 (Ct. App. 1998) (involving an arbitration clause in a monthly bill). 
119 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
331, 332 (1996) (criticizing the Court for going too far in an attempt to “conserve scarce judicial 
resources by encouraging citizens to resolve disputes by private means”); Christopher R. Drahozal, 
“Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 698-99 (2001) (arguing that concern about one-
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These changes made § 2’s blend of federal and state law schizophrenic. The 
Court announced that the FAA “establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor 
of arbitration.”120 For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., the Court held that an arbitration clause in an automobile 
distribution agreement governed antitrust claims that did not arise directly 
from the container contract.121 The Justices opined that when it came to 
delineating the scope of an arbitration clause, “the parties’ intentions control, 
but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.”122 
Yet some lower courts pushed back. Determined to protect their own 
jurisdiction, they reasoned that arbitration provisions ultimately “are 
contracts, and, in interpreting such agreements, . . . courts are to apply state 
contract law.”123 In turn, this maneuver allowed them to exempt claims from 
arbitration by using an array of contract rules that “favor[] the underdog.”124 
Scores of courts held that all or part of an arbitration clause was 
unconscionable: offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, buried in a maze of text, 
and unduly harsh.125 Likewise, judges drew on the doctrine of contra 
proferentem and construed ambiguities in arbitration clauses against the 
drafter.126 Finally, several courts held that consumers and employees “are not 
bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable 
 
sided arbitration provisions is overblown); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the 
Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 
(2001) (contending that “[a] properly designed arbitration system . . . can do a better job of delivering 
accessible justice for average claimants than a litigation-based approach”); David S. Schwartz, 
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled 
Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 40 (1997) (decrying arbitration’s “potential for injustice”); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996) (noting that arbitration clauses “may allow companies to select the 
arbitrators, set the arbitration in a location convenient for the company but not for the little guy, 
exclude certain recoveries such as punitive damages, shorten the statute of limitations, deny discovery 
and other procedural protections, and eliminate virtually any right to appeal”). 
120 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 
121 473 U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985) (likening arbitration clauses to forum selection provisions). 
122 Id. at 626. 
123 Fellows v. Bd. of Trs. of Welborn Clinic, 63 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
124 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 306 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. 
ed. 1998). 
125 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000) 
(indicating that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable where it does not satisfy a “modicum of 
bilaterality” of benefits and burdens between the two parties). 
126 See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 287 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[I]f the 
uncertainty is not removed by . . . other rules of interpretation, a contract must be interpreted most 
strongly against the party who prepared it.”). 
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expectation.”127 When arbitrability was on the table, the Court’s proclamations 
pointed in one direction and contract principles steered in the other.128 
The law has never figured out how to solve this conflict. For the past three 
decades, judges have attacked questions of scope arbitrability by applying a 
formalistic rubric that begins by classifying a provision as either “narrow” or 
“broad.”129 Even this threshold step has sown division. In the Ninth Circuit 
and, arguably, in the Second Circuit, a clause that merely requires arbitration 
for disputes “arising under” the container contract is “narrow[].”130 In contrast, 
the First, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh circuits treat the exact same language 
as “broad.”131 Likewise, all jurisdictions agree that an agreement to arbitrate 
claims “concerning” or “arising out of or relating to” a contract is “broad.”132 
“Narrow” provisions, which are relatively rare, govern allegations 
“relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself.”133 
 
127 Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1979)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra, § 211 cmt. e (“Courts in construing and applying 
a standardized contract seek to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the 
public who accepts it.”). 
128 See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“Thus, in determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts apply the 
contract law of the particular state that governs the formation of contracts. The ‘federal policy 
favoring arbitration, however, is taken into consideration even in applying ordinary state law.’” 
(quoting Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2004)). Compare Huffman v. Hilltop 
Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[W]here ambiguity in agreements involving arbitration 
exists, such as here, the strong presumption in favor of arbitration applies . . . .”), with Solis v. Evins, 
951 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding, in the arbitration context, that “[w]e must, of course, 
resolve uncertainties in favor of ” the nondrafting party). 
129 Fleet Tire Serv. of N. Little Rock v. Oliver Rubber Co., 118 F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1997). 
130 Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Tracer Res. 
Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “arising under” has 
“limited scope”). In In re Kinoshita, 287 F.2d 951, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1961), the Second Circuit held that 
a clause that governed “any dispute or difference [that] should arise under” the contract was “narrow.” 
However, the Second Circuit has since backtracked from Kinoshita. See S.A. Mineracao Da 
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to overrule In re 
Kinoshita but “confin[ing it] to its precise facts”). Accordingly, in the Second Circuit, “only the 
precise language in Kinoshita would evince a narrow clause.” Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad 
Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 2001). 
131 See, e.g., Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 380-82 (1st Cir. 
2011); Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 
577-78 (6th Cir. 2003); Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 724-28 (3d Cir. 2000); Gregory v. 
Electro-Mech. Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 383-86 (11th Cir. 1996); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental 
Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1989). 
132  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 855 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Antonio Leonard TNT 
Prods., LLC v. Goossen-Tutor Promotions, LLC, No. 13-3486, 2015 WL 269147, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 
2015) (“Arbitration clauses that also cover disputes ‘concerning this agreement’ are construed broadly.”). 
133 Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Alternatively, parties sometimes create ad hoc “narrow” clauses by using idiosyncratic language that 
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Accordingly, narrow clauses do not cover conduct that is divorced from the 
underlying agreement between the parties, such as claims for conversion,134 
tortious interference,135 unfair competition,136 unjust enrichment,137 
misappropriation of trade secrets,138 breach of a different contract,139 and 
statutory violations.140 This is true even if the dispute “would not have arisen 
‘but for’ the parties’ agreement.”141 
Conversely, “broad” provisions, which are much more common, create a 
powerful “presumption of arbitrability” and “extend[] to ‘collateral 
matters.’”142 To be arbitrable under a broad clause, a claim need only “hav[e] a 
significant relationship to the [container] contract”143 or “at least ‘touch 
matters’ related to [it].”144 
Unfortunately, there is vast confusion about how the “significant 
relationship” and “touch matters” tests apply to real-world facts. This 
indeterminacy shines through when a consumer or employee accuses a 
defendant of grave wrongdoing. In some jurisdictions, a claim only falls 
within the aegis of a broad clause if the defendant’s actions were “an 
 
limits the ambit of their agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., Turi v. Main St. Adoption Servs., LLP, 633 
F.3d 496, 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (clause that required arbitration for “fees charged by” an adoption 
agency did not govern claims for fraud, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and RICO violations because 
the claims “seek damages . . . that are separate from the fees paid” to the organization); In re TFT-
LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5781 , 2013 WL 3784938, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2013) 
(holding that a provision that mandated arbitration “[i]f a dispute arises between the parties 
regarding the terms of this [a]greement” did not apply to antitrust claims). 
134 Mediterranean Enters., 708 F.2d at 1465. A claim for negligence might trigger a “narrow” 
clause depending on its nature. See Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 924 (refusing to compel arbitration 
of negligence complaint). But see Glass Design, Inc. v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. 
12-132, 2013 WL 12091106, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2013) (opining that negligence allegations 
stemming from shoddy repair work fell within the scope of a “narrow” clause because they “relate 
directly to the relationships, obligations, provisions, acts, and omissions allegedly established by the 
[contract]” (quoting Alexander v. U.S. Credit Mgmt., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006 (N.D. Tex. 2005))). 
135 A & A Mech., Inc. v. Satterfield & Pontikes Constr. Grp., 83 So. 3d 363, 365, 369 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
136 N. Am. Deer Registry, Inc. v. DNA Sols., Inc., No. 17-00062, 2017 WL 2120015, at *6 (E.D. 
Tex. May 16, 2017). 
137 RCM Techs., Inc. v. Constr. Servs. Assocs., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.N.J. 2001). 
138 Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994). 
139 Mediterranean Enters., 708 F.2d at 1464. 
140 See, e.g., Busey v. Richland Sch. Dist., No. 13-5022, 2013 WL 12203526, at *3 (E.D. Wash. 
June 21, 2013) (refusing to compel arbitration because the “Defendants’ liability arises from 
independent statutory and constitutional provisions which accord the Plaintiff rights irrespective of 
the employment contract”). 
141 Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 924 (9th Cir. 2011). 
142 JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Louis 
Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
143 Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2009). 
144 Snyder v. CACH, LLC, No. 16-00097, 2016 WL 6662675, at *11, n.13 (D. Haw. Nov. 10, 2016). 
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immediate, foreseeable result of the performance of contractual duties.”145 
Consider Clay v. New Mexico Title Loans, Inc., which began when Harry Clay 
used his truck as security for a loan that featured a broad arbitration clause.146 
After Clay defaulted, an agent of the lender went to repossess the vehicle, got 
into an altercation with Clay, pulled out a gun, and shot Clay in front of his 
young daughter.147 Clay, who was paralyzed, sued the lender under a variety 
of theories, including breach of the loan agreement and negligent hiring.148 A 
New Mexico appellate court ordered arbitration of Clay’s contract claims, but 
exempted his tort allegations, reasoning that the provision did not cover 
causes of action that were “unrelated to the agreement [or] out of the context 
of the agreement.”149 
Yet other judges are more willing to find that similar claims are arbitrable. 
Their version of the “significant relationship” or “touch matters” tests simply 
asks whether the container contract plays a prominent role in the complaint. For 
example, in Fazio v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., Frank Gruttadauria, a Cleveland 
stockbroker, worked for several investment houses that subjected their clients to 
broad arbitration clauses.150 Over the course of his career, Gruttadauria illegally 
withdrew $54 million to fund a Ponzi scheme.151 When his customers learned of 
his deception, they sued his employers for fraud and violation of securities 
laws.152 The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration clauses because 
Gruttadauria’s behavior “could not have been within the reasonable 
contemplation of the Plaintiffs when they signed the alleged account 
agreements.”153 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations 
 
145 Telecom Italia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001). Seen 
this way, a broad provision cannot govern actions that were “not contemplated by the parties when 
the contract was made.” Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1999). 
146 288 P.3d 888, 891 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
147 Id. at 891-92. 
148 Id. at 892. 
149 Id. at 896. Likewise, in Sutton v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506 (D. 
Md. 2002), Robert Sutton, who was African American, went to rent a movie at Hollywood Video. A 
clerk misidentified Sutton as the “black male” who had just robbed the store, causing him to be arrested 
in a humiliating fashion. Id. at 506-07. The court held that the broad arbitration clause in Sutton’s video 
store rental agreement did not apply to his tort claims. Id. at 511-12. The court acknowledged that “the 
terms of the contract suggest that the parties are compelled to arbitrate matters related to matters such 
as the rental fees, repairs, replacements of videos.” Id. at 511. “For example,” the court noted, “logical 
claims to be arbitrated might include matters such as a dispute over dishonored checks written by the 
customer or destruction of rented videos by the customer.” Id. at 511-12. The court found that Sutton’s 
claims did not fall into those categories, stating that “claims such as those alleged here—malicious 
prosecution, false imprisonment, etc.—are completely independent of, let alone significantly related 
to, the membership agreements for video rentals.” Id. at 512. 
150 340 F.3d 386, 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2003). 
151 Id. at 391. 
152 Id. at 391-92. 
153 Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (N.D. Ohio 2002), rev’d, 340 F.3d 386 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
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“‘touch[ed] matters’ covered by the [agreement]” because it would be impossible 
to tell the story of the case without mentioning the container contract.154 
Three recurring fact patterns have generated especially unpredictable 
results. First, courts are torn over whether to compel arbitration of an 
employee’s tort claims against an employer stemming from a sexual assault 
committed by a co-worker. Federal judges in Florida, New York, and Texas 
have held that these allegations trigger a broad arbitration clause in the 
employment agreement.155 The logic here is that even if a work-based attack 
was heinous, the mere fact that it was work-based meant that it “related to or 
ar[ose] from” the underlying contract.156 Indeed, as one judge put it, “these 
claims do not merely touch on [the plaintiff ’s] employment, they are entirely 
based on her employment.”157 However, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and 
state courts in California, Kentucky, and Mississippi have disagreed.158 
Focusing less on the setting and more on the deplorable nature of the 
wrongdoing, they announced that “rape does not ordinarily arise out of the 
employment context”159 and that an arbitration provision’s “scope certainly 
stops at [the plaintiff ’s] bedroom door.”160 
Second, courts disagree about the arbitrability of tort claims related to 
death. Suppose an employee, medical patient, or nursing home resident signs 
 
154 Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395 (second brackets in original) (quoting Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & 
Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Natale v. Frantz Ward, L.L.P., 110 N.E.3d 829, 832 
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2018) (holding that plaintiff ’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress fell under broad arbitration clause in his partnership agreement because “a court would 
necessarily have to refer to the partnership agreement to understand the facts underlying his claim”). 
155 See, e.g., Forbes v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 08-552, 2009 WL 424146, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 18, 2009) (requiring employee to arbitrate her allegations that a supervisor sexually assaulted 
her at a work-related conference); Barker v. Halliburton Co., 541 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882, 887 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008) (same for civilian contractor stationed in Iraq); Oravetz v. Halliburton Co., No. 07-20285, 
2007 WL 7067475, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2007) (reasoning that the plaintiff needed to arbitrate her 
sexual assault claims by noting that she “repeatedly alleges that her assailant was acting in violation 
of [d]efendants’ employment policies”). 
156 Forbes, 2009 WL 424146, at *8. 
157 Barker, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 887 (emphasis added). 
158 See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1219 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that an 
employee’s claims of sexual assault were “not an immediate, foreseeable result of the performance of 
the parties’ contractual duties” and were thus “not within the scope of the arbitration clause” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“Jones’ allegations [of sexual assault] do not touch matters related to her employment, let alone 
have a significant relationship to her employment contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Abou-Khalil v. Miles, No. 037752, 2007 WL 1589456, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 4, 2007) (“[T]he law 
is clear that sexual assault is not normally within the course and scope of employment.”); Hill v. 
Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to “expand the arbitration agreement” 
to include claims of rape, assault, and battery that were “independent of the employment 
relationship”); cf. Doe v. Hallmark Partners, 227 So. 3d 1052, 1056-58 (Miss. 2017) (holding that the 
plaintiff was not required to arbitrate sexual assault tort claims despite a “broad” arbitration clause). 
159 Hill, 945 S.W.2d at 952. 
160 Jones, 583 F.3d at 239. 
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a contract that contains an arbitration clause and then is killed by the drafter’s 
negligence. Many states recognize a cause of action for wrongful death, in 
which the decedent’s family sues to recover damages for their own economic 
and emotional harm.161 However, wrongful death complaints come in two 
different varieties. In some states, such a claim flows “directly from the claim 
possessed by the decedent, had he or she lived.”162 As a result, such a lawsuit 
is “derivative,” meaning that the victim’s relatives “stand in the position of 
their decedent” and are bound by the arbitration agreement in the container 
contract.163 But elsewhere, “[a] wrongful death action is not a transmitted 
right nor a survival right but is created and vested in the statutorily 
designated survivors at the moment of death.”164 Accordingly, in these states, 
a plaintiff is not a party “to the initial agreement containing an arbitration 
clause [and] is not bound by the clause in her independent cause of action for 
the wrongful death.”165 Thus, courts have not spoken with a single voice about 
the arbitrability of wrongful death claims. 
 
161 See, e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, It’s a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful 
Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 62-63 (1990) (canvassing the development of these laws). 
The decedent’s estate can also assert a survival action, which attempts to recover damages for the 
decedent’s medical costs or pain and suffering. See, e.g., Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 1994). 
Survival actions are arbitrable because the decedent “agreed to arbitrate his claims against the 
company, whether brought during his life or after his death.” Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 
873 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (Oh. 2007); see also Peltz ex rel. Estate of Peltz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 367 
F. Supp. 2d 711, 718 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that decedent’s administrator “merely stands in her 
shoes” and is thus bound by an arbitration clause that the decedent signed); In re Golden Peanut 
Co., 298 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Tex. 2009) (“If [the decedent] had sued for his own injuries immediately 
before his death, he would have been bound to submit his claims to arbitration.”). 
162 THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x 813, 817 (10th Cir. 2013). 
163 Carter v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 860 So. 2d 1187, 1192 (Miss. 2003); Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. 
GGNSC St. Paul Lake Ridge LLC, 310 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990 (D. Minn. 2018); Laizure v. Avante at 
Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752, 761-62 (Fla. 2013); Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 
Soc’y, 886 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Iowa 2016). 
164 Finney v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 193 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). Because this 
version of the claim arises out of the wrongful death statute, it is “in no way related to the [container] 
agreement.” McCall ex rel. Estate of McCall v. SSC Montgomery S. Haven Operating Co., No. 14-
588, 2015 WL 13603823, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2015). Likewise, in some states, “[a] loss of 
consortium claim is also a statutorily created independent claim that accrues to the spouse. 
Therefore, just as a decedent cannot bind his heirs to arbitrate a wrongful death claim, the decedent 
also cannot bind his heirs to arbitrate a loss of consortium claim.” Life Care Ctrs. v. Neblett, No. 
14-00124, 2014 WL 7179652, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2014) (internal citations omitted); accord Roth, 
886 N.W.2d at 613 (holding that “the [decedent’s] child owns the . . . consortium claim”). 
165 Finney, 193 S.W.3d at 397; see also Estate of Decamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care & 
Rehab, Inc., 234 Ariz. 18, 316 P.3d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a wrongful death claim 
against a nursing home not arbitrable because it “is independently held by the decedent’s statutory 
beneficiaries”); Norton v. United Health Servs. of Ga., Inc., 783 S.E.2d 437, 440-41 (Ga. App. 2016) 
(“[T]here is no evidence that [decedent]’s wrongful death beneficiaries entered into an agreement 
to arbitrate their separate distinct claims.”), rev’d, 797 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. 2017); Carter v. SSC Odin 
Operating Co., 976 N.E.2d 344, 355-58 (Ill. 2012) (refusing to hold wrongful-death action plaintiff 
to decedent’s arbitration agreement); Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 600 (Ky. 2012) 
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Third, it can be unclear whether arbitration clauses outlive the container 
contract. In general, when a deal terminates, so do the parties’ rights and 
obligations.166 But if the duty to arbitrate ended along with the agreement, 
parties could game the system and guarantee themselves a judicial forum 
simply by waiting to sue until the day after the contract lapsed. Thus, the 
Court has held that claims brought after the container contract has expired 
are presumptively arbitrable if they feature (1) facts that occurred before the 
contract ended, (2) rights that vested under the arrangement, or (3) 
obligations that were supposed to “survive[] expiration of the remainder of 
the agreement.”167 
Not every case slots neatly into one of these categories. For example, a 
federal court in Mississippi held that an arbitration clause in an employee’s 
initial hiring paperwork did not apply when he worked for Red Lobster from 
2002 until 2003, quit, worked for Red Lobster again from 2006 until 2013, 
quit, and then sued for sexual harassment.168 Likewise, in the credit, 
distribution, lease, and subscription contexts—where the parties sometimes 
continue to interact after the container contract terminates—“an arbitration 
agreement may survive . . . with respect to certain claims, but not others.”169 
To conclude, courts struggle with whether broad arbitration clauses cover 
egregious acts, apply to nonparties, and persist beyond the termination of the 
container contract. As I discuss next, businesses have begun to try to draft 
around these pockets of doctrinal chaos. 
 
(same); FutureCare NorthPoint, LLC v. Peeler, 143 A.3d 191, 209-10, 213 (Md. 2016) (same); Wolcott 
v. Summerville at Outlook Manor, LLC, 61 N.E.3d 853, 856 (Oh. Ct. App. 2016) (same); Boler v. 
Sec. Health Care, L.L.C., 336 P.3d 468, 477 (Okla. 2014) (same); Woodall v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Fed. 
Way, LLC, 231 P.3d 1252, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (same). 
166 See, e.g., Poore v. Simpson Paper Co., 566 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the 
contract at issue has expired, the parties are ‘released . . . from their respective contractual obligations’ 
and any dispute between them cannot be said to arise under the contract” (citation omitted)). 
167 Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991). Initially, the Court had 
announced that “where the dispute is over a provision of [an] expired agreement, the presumptions 
favoring arbitrability must be negated expressly or by clear implication.” Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 
358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 430 U.S. 243, 255 (1977). Later, the Court 
clarified that this presumption of arbitrability only applies to “disputes arising out of the relation 
governed by contract.” Litton, 501 U.S. at 204. 
168 Walker v. Red Lobster Rests., LLC, No. 14-449, 2015 WL 3970917, at *1, *3 (S.D. Miss. 
June 30, 2015). For other cases finding that an employee’s claim did not arise out of an expired 
contract, see Zucker v. After Six, Inc., 174 F. App’x 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2006), Mendez v. Puerto Rican 
Int’l Cos., No. 05-00174, 2010 WL 2654439, at *1 (D.V.I. July 1, 2010), aff ’d sub nom. Mendez v. Puerto 
Rican Int’l Cos., 438 F. App’x 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2011), and Vara v. Menard, Inc., No. 05-0551, 2005 WL 
2886075, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2005). 
169 Hinnant v. Am. Ingenuity, LLC, 554 F. Supp. 2d 576, 583 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
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B. Infinite Arbitration Clauses 
This Section reveals that companies have tried to patch the holes in broad 
clauses by mandating arbitration for every dispute between any associated 
parties for eternity. Courts first gave these infinite clauses the cold shoulder 
by applying traditional principles of contract interpretation and the 
unconscionability defense. However, the Court’s recent cases have unsettled 
the law by implying that the FAA preempts any state rule that discriminates 
against arbitration. 
1. The Rise of the Infinite Clause 
Shortly after the dawn of the new millennium, arbitration clauses 
metastasized. For one, companies stopped confining their provisions to claims 
that “arose out of or related to” the container contract.170 For example, when 
AT&T acquired Cingular and formed Mobility171—an entity that boasts 
almost 147,000,000 customers172—it revamped its arbitration clause to cover 
“all disputes and claims.”173 Sprint soon followed suit, changing its 70,000,000 
arbitration provisions to cover “ANY (we really mean ANY) disagreements.”174 
Ultra-broad arbitration provisions began to appear in employment contracts,175 
 
170 To be clear, infinite arbitration clauses are not a twenty-first century innovation. See In re 
Canadian Gulf Line, 98 F.2d 711, 712 (2d Cir. 1938) (featuring a maritime contract that required 
arbitration of “any dispute . . . between the Owners and the Charterers”). However, it is only in the 
last decade or so that infinite clauses have gone mainstream. 
171 See Alan Sipress & Sara Kehaulani Goo, AT&T Completes BellSouth Takeover, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 30, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/29/AR2006122901 
048.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/LVZ8-BJ5Y]. 
172 See Arne Holst, Wireless Subscriptions Market Share by Carrier in the U.S. from 1st Quarter 2011 
to 3rd Quarter 2018, STATISTA (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/199359/market-
share-of-wireless-carriers-in-the-us-by-subscriptions/ [https://perma.cc/63X3-UW6W]. 
173 File a Complaint, AT&T, https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html#!/wireless/KM1041856 
[https://perma.cc/GK45-7VDB] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). Previously, Cingular had only mandated 
arbitration for “all disputes and claims . . . arising out of or relating to this Agreement.” Response to 
Defendant AT&T Mobility Corp.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Pursuant to the Federal 
Arbitration Act at 7, Weinstein v. AT&T Mobility Corp., 2008 WL 1914754 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2008) 
(No. 07-2880) (emphasis added). 
174 Sprint Terms and Conditions, SPRINT, https://www.sprint.com/en/legal/terms-and-
conditions.html [https://perma.cc/2993-VQP4] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). This language replaced 
Sprint’s previous clause requiring arbitration for “claims, controversies[,] or disputes arising out of 
or relating to this agreement.” Petition to Compel Arbitration and for Related Relief ¶ 11, Emilio v. 
Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. 08-7147 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2008), 2008 WL 4518240 (emphasis omitted). 
175 See, e.g., Lemmon v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (“I 
agree that any claim dispute or controversy between myself and the Company shall be submitted to 
and determined exclusively by binding arbitration . . . .”). 
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bank account paperwork,176 agreements to rent cars177 or equipment,178 and 
even applications to join the Church of Scientology.179 Some were verbose, 
like a loan that insisted on arbitration for “all disputes, claims, or controversies 
whether based upon any prior, current, or future agreement, loan, account, 
service, activity, transaction (proposed or actual), event or occurrence 
(‘Disputes’) whether individual, joint, or class in nature, including contract 
and tort disputes and any other matter at law or equity.”180 Others were simple, 
such as the cruise line that required its employees to arbitrate 
“all . . . disputes”181 and the for-profit university that informed its students 
that “any dispute between us shall be submitted to [a]rbitration.”182 
Businesses also began enlarging arbitration clauses along other 
dimensions. Recall that many jurisdictions exempt wrongful death claims 
from arbitration because the plaintiffs in such a case—the decedent’s 
relatives—never signed the container contract.183 Companies attempted to 
write their way around this hurdle by stating that the arbitration agreement 
govern[s] “all persons whose claim is derived through or on behalf of the 
[signatory], including any parent, spouse, sibling, child, guardian, executor, 
 
176 See, e.g., Regions’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings at 3, Regions 
Bank v. Douglas, 2012 WL 5400040 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 5, 2012) (No. 12-00523) (quoting an arbitration 
clause that applies to “any dispute, disagreement, claim or controversy . . . regardless of when the 
dispute arose” (emphasis omitted)). 
177 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, HERTZ, https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/member/enrollment/ 
displayTermsAndConditions [https://perma.cc/9V6J-UUEV] (last updated Oct. 31, 2019) (“Except for 
claims for property damage, personal injury, or death, ANY DISPUTES BETWEEN US MUST BE 
RESOLVED ONLY BY ARBITRATION OR IN A SMALL CLAIMS COURT ON AN 
INDIVIDUAL BASIS . . . .”). 
178 Appellants’ Brief at 3-4, Granger v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 503 S.W.3d 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) 
(No. 79584), 2016 WL 3771603. This case entailed arbitration agreements for rental of a television and 
of a refrigerator; the former described “claims” as “any claim, dispute, or controversy between you and 
us that in any way arises from the RPA or the leased property . . .” and the latter provided that “claims 
shall be interpreted as broadly as the law allows, and means any dispute or controversy between you 
and Rent-A-Center, its officers, directors, employees, or agents . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). 
179 See Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., No. 13-220-27, 2015 WL 10844160, 
at *10 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) (“[S]hould any dispute, claim, or controversy arise between me and the 
Church . . . I will pursue resolution of that dispute, claim or controversy solely and exclusively through 
Scientology’s Internal Ethics, Justice and binding religious arbitration procedures . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
180 Southland Health Servs., Inc. v. Bank of Vernon, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (N.D. Ala. 2012). 
181 Yuzwa v. M/V OOSTERDAM, No. 12-2663, 2012 WL 6675171, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012). 
182 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Notice of Motion and 
Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration and Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration at 3, Ferguson 
v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 11-00127, 2011 WL 13262654 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2011) (citation 
omitted). As John Coyle has recently shown, drafters in business-to-business transactions have also 
created forum selection clauses that govern “any claim arising out of the parties’ relationship.” John 
F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1804 n.47 (2019). 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 164–165. 
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legal representative, administrator, or heir.”184 Likewise, firms offered to lend 
their arbitration rights to a rainbow of nonsignatory defendants, such as their 
“members, shareholders, or subsidiary or parent or affiliated companies, and 
its or their officers, directors, employees, and agents.”185 And to ensure that 
their arbitration clauses endured after the container contract expired, drafters 
included language specifying that the commitment to arbitrate “survives the 
termination of your [s]ervice[s] with us”186 or “[i]s indefinite.”187 
Finally, businesses added another layer of private dispute resolution by 
requiring disputes about the arbitrability of a particular lawsuit to be decided 
in arbitration. Through delegation clauses, they gave the arbitrator the 
exclusive right to decide whether a dispute fell within the scope of an 
arbitration clause. From banking to employment to telecommunications, 
companies mandated arbitration not just for substantive claims, but for 
conflict related to “the validity, enforceability or scope of [an] Arbitration 
Provision.”188 Thus, when plaintiffs objected that an arbitration clause did not 
encompass a specific cause of action, these businesses countered that the 
parties had “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to arbitrate the matter.189 
 
184 Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. GGNSC St. Paul Lake Ridge LLC, 310 F. Supp. 3d 985, 987 (D. 
Minn. 2018). 
185 Gerardino v. TPVI Ltd., No. 08-0016, 2009 WL 1586673, at *1 (D.V.I. June 2, 2009). 
186 Milfort v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt. LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2018). 
187 Hodsdon v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 12-2827, 2012 WL 5464615, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 989 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation 
omitted); see also Barker v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. 03-0130, 2003 WL 25943008, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 
May 30, 2003) (addressing language in a credit card agreement that classifies as “subject to 
arbitration . . . [c]laims regarding the application, enforceability, or interpretation of this 
Agreement and this arbitration provision . . . .”). 
189 Aceves v. Autonation, Inc., 317 F. App’x 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, even when a 
contract does not contain an express delegation clause, it often achieves the same result through the 
back door. Drafters often choose to arbitrate under the auspices of a particular institution, such as the 
American Arbitration Association or JAMS. In turn, these companies have internal rules that permit 
the arbitrator to rule on “any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration 
agreement.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 17 (2016), https://www. 
adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/89H8-STGC]; accord JAMS, 
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 15 (2014), https://www.jams 
adr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F8Q4-S63W] (allowing “[t]he [a]rbitrator . . . to determine jurisdiction and 
arbitrability issues as a preliminary matter”). Courts routinely find that merely referencing an 
arbitration provider incorporates these rules by reference and thus functions as a delegation clause. See, 
e.g., Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding, when the arbitration 
agreement provided that “arbitration shall be administered by JAMS and conducted in accordance with 
its Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures . . . except as provided otherwise herein,” the parties 
had thus “incorporated the JAMS Rules into their Agreement” and “intended for an arbitrator to decide 
issues of arbitrability” (emphasis omitted)); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(“[W]e hold that incorporation of the AAA rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that 
contracting parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”). 
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2. Judicial Skepticism 
Initially, judges pushed back against infinite language. The poster child 
for this movement was Smith v. Steinkamp, a 2003 Seventh Circuit decision.190 
Sheila Smith took out a payday loan from Instant Cash and signed an 
agreement “to arbitrate ‘all disputes’ between the [p]arties.”191 A month later, 
Smith borrowed from Instant Cash again, but did not sign an arbitration 
agreement.192 Eventually, Smith sued Instant Cash, arguing that the second 
loan violated state usury law and RICO.193 Instant Cash moved to compel 
arbitration, arguing that Smith’s lawsuit was a “dispute[] between the 
[p]arties” and thus triggered the first loan’s arbitration clause.194 Speaking 
through Judge Posner, the court rejected this interpretation by listing the 
absurd consequences it would spawn: 
[I]f Instant Cash murdered Smith in order to discourage defaults and her 
survivors brought a wrongful death suit against Instant Cash . . . , Instant 
Cash could insist that the wrongful death claim be submitted to arbitration. 
For that matter, if an employee of Instant Cash picked Smith’s pocket when 
she came in to pay back the loan, and Smith sued the employee for 
conversion, he would be entitled to arbitration of her claim. It would make 
no difference that the conversion had occurred in Smith’s home 20 years after 
her last transaction with Instant Cash.195 
In addition, Judge Posner added that an agreement “to arbitrate disputes 
arising out of future agreements . . . might be thought unconscionable.”196 
Although several courts followed Smith’s footsteps, they disagreed on 
precisely what was objectionable about infinite provisions. Some ran with 
Judge Posner’s suggestion and held that mandating arbitration for complaints 
that were attenuated from the container contract would be unconscionable. 
For example, in Valued Services of Kentucky, LLC v. Watkins, Floyd Watkins 
received a payday loan from Check Advance that contained an infinite 
clause.197 When the balance became due, Watkins went to Check Advance and 
 
190 318 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2003). 
191 Consolidated Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 1, Smith, 318 F.3d 775 (Nos. 02-2649, 
02-2650), 2002 WL 32171900 [hereinafter Smith Reply Brief]. 
192 Smith, 318 F.3d at 777. 
193 Id. at 776. 
194 Smith Reply Brief, supra note 191. 
195 Smith, 318 F.3d at 777. 
196 Id. at 778. Judge Posner also noted that the arbitration agreement only applied to the first 
loan and the parties’ “prior . . . agreements.” Id. at 777 (emphasis added). In turn, this suggested that 
the arbitration clause did not cover the second loan, which came later. Id. Ultimately, though, he 
“d[id] not put too much weight on this point” and remarked that the defendant might lose even if 
“the word ‘prior’ had not appeared” in first loan’s arbitration agreement. Id. at 777-78. 
197 309 S.W.3d 256, 258-61 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009). 
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told the manager that he needed three more days to raise the funds.198 The 
manager pushed a button that locked her office door, refused to open it, 
telephoned her boss, and said, “I have a black guy over here that refuses to 
pay his bill and he’s not going to leave until he does.”199 Watkins, who was 
detained until the police arrived, sued Check Advance for false 
imprisonment.200 A Kentucky appellate court held that enforcing the infinite 
provision would be grossly unfair, comparing it to ordering “arbitration had 
[d]efendants sent 2 men to [p]laintiff ’s house to break his legs because he was 
behind in his payment.”201 
Other judges reached the same result under rules of contract 
interpretation. For instance, in Aiken v. World Finance Corp., the South 
Carolina Supreme Court created what became known as the “outrageous 
torts” exception to the FAA.202 Richard Aiken borrowed money from World 
Finance.203 Aiken’s contract mandated arbitration for claims “arising out of 
any prior or future dealings between lender and borrower.”204 Two years after 
Aiken had paid off his debt, World Finance personnel used Aiken’s social 
security number to take out loans in his name and steal the proceeds.205 When 
Aiken sued for negligent hiring, World Finance argued that his lawsuit 
“aros[e] out of” the parties’ “prior dealings” because his finance application 
gave the rogue employees “access to [his] information in order to carry out 
their crimes.”206 Without denying that the plain language of the arbitration 
clause covered Aiken’s complaint, the state high court refused to send the case 
to arbitration.207 Instead, the justices held that “even the most broadly-
worded arbitration agreements” do not govern conduct that is so extreme that 
it is “unforeseeable to a reasonable consumer in the context of normal 
business dealings.”208 
Finally, other courts ignored infinite language without explaining their 
holdings. Rust v. Carriage Services provides a memorable example.209 The 
Rusts purchased a crypt in a mausoleum to hold the remains of a relative (the 
 
198 Id. at 258. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 259. 
201 Id. at 261, 265. 
202 644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (S.C. 2007). 
203 Id. at 707. 
204 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 707-08. 
207 Id. at 710. 
208 Id. at 709; see also Arnold v. Burger King, 48 N.E.3d 69, 72, 78 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (relying 
on Aiken to refuse to compel arbitration of workplace rape claim even though arbitration agreement 
covered “events outside the scope of [the plaintiff ’s] employment” (emphasis omitted)). 
209 173 P.3d 805 (Ok. Ct. App. 2007). 
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“crypt contract”).210 Their agreement with the cemetery did not contain an 
arbitration clause.211 Years later, the couple bought a commemorative bench 
from the same graveyard and signed a contract that required them to arbitrate 
“any controversy or claim arising between the parties” (the “bench 
contract”).212 The couple then visited their relative’s crypt and made a 
horrifying discovery: “[T]he body in the crypt above their decedent’s was 
interred in a way that caused the crypt to leak decaying human remains out 
of the crypt and onto the crypt containing Rusts’ decedent.”213 According to 
the Rusts, “when they visited their decedent’s crypt, . . . they touched the 
liquid in an effort to determine what the substance was, and . . . became 
physically ill when they realized what they had touched.”214 The Rusts sued 
for negligent treatment of human remains and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and the cemetery tried to invoke the arbitration clause in 
the bench contract.215 A divided Oklahoma appellate court denied the motion, 
reasoning that the lawsuit arose from the crypt contract, not the bench 
contract.216 But as the dissent pointed out, the majority simply did not 
address the brute fact that “the arbitration provision is not limited to disputes 
arising out of the contract containing the arbitration clause,” but rather “applies 
to any dispute between the parties.”217 
Accordingly, until 2010, although the law was embryonic, most courts 
believed that arbitration agreements “cannot cover every type of dispute that 
might arise.”218 But as I explain next, that would soon change. 
3. The Arbitration Revolution 
In the last decade, the Court has revolutionized the field of forced 
arbitration. As the Justices expanded the degree to which the FAA preempts 
state law, they may have implicitly overruled the lower court cases that refused 
to enforce infinite language. Likewise, by embracing delegation provisions, the 
Court has made it easier for companies to entrust arbitrators with deciding the 
very issue of whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause. 
 
210 Id. at 807. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
213 Id. at 808 n.5. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 808. 
216 Id. at 808-09. 
217 Id. at 809 (Buettner, J., dissenting). 
218 RN Sol., Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare W., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 902 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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a.	 Preemption 
The backdrop for the Court’s recent cases is the intersection of the FAA 
and class actions. For decades, businesses and chambers of commerce had 
condemned the class device for allowing plaintiffs’ lawyers to combine 
thousands of nuisance lawsuits into a single complaint and then wield 
“blackmail” settlement pressure.219 But as the Justices ramped up the FAA, 
businesses saw a cure for this scourge.220 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
they started inserting class action waivers into their forced arbitration clauses 
and arguing that their customers and employees had agreed not only to 
arbitrate, but to do so on an individual basis.221 
Then, in the mid-2000s, this attempt at private law reform hit a speed 
bump. Recall that § 2 allows courts to strike down arbitration clauses under 
traditional contract law (i.e., any “grounds [that] . . . exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract”).222 In 2005, the California Supreme Court 
invoked this principle in § 2 in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, an influential 
decision holding that class arbitration waivers are unconscionable when 
applied to many low-value consumer claims.223 Soon more than a dozen 
jurisdictions endorsed this logic, reasoning that because few plaintiffs will 
actually prosecute their own small dollar grievances, class arbitration waivers 
unfairly immunize drafters from liability.224 
However, in 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion that the FAA preempts Discover Bank and its progeny.225 The Court 
conceded that unconscionability is a “ground[] . . . for the revocation of any 
contract” under § 2.226 Nevertheless, the Justices determined that Discover 
Bank’s use of the doctrine violated the FAA’s goal of “enforc[ing] . . . arbitration 
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
 
219 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)). 
220 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern 
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396-98 (2005) (describing the rise of class arbitration waivers 
in the late 1990s). 
221 See Margaret Mannix, No Suits for You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 7, 1999, 58, 60 
(“Many arbitration clauses state that consumers cannot file class-action lawsuits—a key reason the 
clauses are spreading so quickly.”). 
222 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
223 113 P.3d 1100, 1110-12 (Cal. 2005). 
224 See Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 275 (Ill. 2006) (“[T]he plaintiff ’s 
only reasonable, cost-effective means of obtaining a complete remedy [was] as either the 
representative or a member of a class.”); David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 
Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1237 n.165 (2013) (collecting cases in 
jurisdictions that endorsed this logic). 
225 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
226 Id. at 341 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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proceedings.”227 According to the Court, Discover Bank undercut this goal by 
insisting that classwide arbitration be available for small claims, which made 
the dispute resolution process slower and more formal.228 Although Concepcion 
dealt with the singular setting of class actions and arbitration, it also broke new 
ground by finding that an entrenched principle like unconscionability could be 
preempted. Thus, some judges and commentators read the opinion to stand for 
the bold proposition that any state law that “ha[s] a disproportionate impact on 
arbitration agreements” must bow to the FAA.229 
Then, on the heels of Concepcion, the Court brought FAA preemption into 
the realm of contract interpretation in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia.230 In 2004, 
DIRECTV added a class arbitration waiver to its customer agreement.231 A 
year later, Discover Bank came down, making it likely that DIRECTV’s 
provision was unconscionable in certain states.232 But if a court invalidated 
the class arbitration waiver, DIRECTV strongly preferred to litigate class 
claims in court, where there was less danger of getting stung by a massive 
judgment with no meaningful appellate review. Therefore, the company 
addressed this contingency through a “blow up clause,” which declared that 
“if the ‘law of your state’ makes the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, 
then the entire arbitration provision ‘is unenforceable.’”233 
In 2008, a class of California plaintiffs sued DIRECTV for charging an 
illegal early termination fee.234 The case was still percolating through the legal 
system in 2011, when the Court decided Concepcion and shielded many class 
arbitration waivers from judicial review.235 Nevertheless, in 2014, a California 
appellate court held that DIRECTV’s class arbitration waiver was invalid 
“under the law of” the California Supreme Court’s now-defunct Discover 
Bank opinion.236 In turn, under the blow up clause, “the entire arbitration 
agreement [wa]s unenforceable.”237 
 
227 Id. at 344. 
228 Id. at 347-49. 
229 Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Arpan 
A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing Viability of Arbitration 
Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 408 (2013) (arguing that Concepcion “threatens to jeopardize a 
bevy of facially neutral contract laws as they are applied to arbitration agreements”). 
230 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015). 
231 Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 815 (Ct. App. 2006), abrogated by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
232 See supra text accompanying notes 223–224. 
233 Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 198 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 
463 (2015). 
234 Id. at 192. 
235 Id. at 193. 
236 Id. at 194. 
237 Id. at 198. 
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The Supreme Court reversed.238 The Justices admitted that “the 
interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a matter of state law to which we 
defer,”239 but held that the state appellate panel had grossly distorted the 
meaning of the blow up clause.240 Specifically, the Court noted that there was 
no authority for the view that the phrase “the law of your state” included 
“state laws authoritatively held to be invalid.”241 Thus, the Court held that 
California appellate court had flouted federal law by failing to “place 
arbitration contracts ‘on equal footing with all other contracts.’”242 
Concepcion and DIRECTV imperil the decisions that refused to enforce 
infinite language. To make this point concrete, consider In re Jiffy Lube 
International, Inc., Text Spam Litigation, an early and oft-cited opinion 
rejecting infinite language.243 A class of consumers sued Heartland 
Automotive Services, Inc., which operates hundreds of Jiffy Lube 
franchises.244 The plaintiffs alleged that Heartland had violated the TCPA by 
harvesting their phone numbers when they received oil changes and sending 
them spam text messages.245 However, at least one plaintiff had signed a Jiffy 
Lube “pledge of satisfaction” that required him to arbitrate “any and all 
disputes, controversies or claims between Jiffy Lube® and you.”246 A 
California district court held that this unlimited obligation to arbitrate did 
not govern the complaint for two reasons.247 First, it opined that an 
arbitration provision that “is not limited to disputes arising from or related 
to the transaction or contract at issue . . . would clearly be unconscionable.”248 
Second, it observed that it would be unreasonable to interpret the arbitration 
provision to encompass a statutory violation that had so little in common with 
the container contract.249 
However, the Court’s recent opinions suggest that the FAA trumps this 
logic. For example, Concepcion held that a court cannot apply the 
unconscionability doctrine in a way that discriminates against arbitration.250 
Jiffy Lube and other opinions have concluded that infinite provisions are 
 
238 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015). 
239 Id. at 468. 
240 Id. at 469. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 471 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
243 847 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262-63 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Although Jiffy Lube was decided shortly after 
Concepcion, the ramifications of the Court’s decision had not yet set in, as evidenced by the fact that 
Jiffy Lube does not discuss Concepcion in depth at all. 
244 Id. at 1255. 
245 Id. at 1255-56. 
246 Id. at 1262. 
247 Id. at 1262-63. 
248 Id. at 1262-63. 
249 Id. at 1263. 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 226–229. 
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grossly harsh because they govern conduct that “could not have been foreseen 
by [the plaintiff] when he signed that agreement.”251 Arguably, this use of the 
unconscionability doctrine draws the very inference that Concepcion prohibits: 
that there is something inherently troubling about private dispute resolution. 
Indeed, even if the breadth of an infinite clause is surprising, it simply means 
that a plaintiff must arbitrate a claim that she thought she might litigate. 
Deeming such an arrangement to be “unfair” treats arbitration as tainted and 
inferior. Accordingly, at least one court has noted that holding that an infinite 
clause “is unconscionably broad would be in tension with Concepcion.”252 
Jiffy Lube’s other ground for annulling infinite language might not fare 
better. In the same breath as its unconscionability rhetoric, Jiffy Lube also 
observed that, given the narrow subject matter of the “pledge of satisfaction” 
and the unrelated nature of the company’s wrongdoing, “it is doubtful 
whether [reading the arbitration clause to cover all issues ‘aris[ing] out of or 
relate[d] to’] would encompass the claims here.”253 Seen through this prism, 
principles of contract interpretation can exempt unforeseeable causes of 
action from the seemingly-limitless reach of an infinite clause. But after 
DIRECTV, this reasoning is suspect. Indeed, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court, which invented the “outrageous torts” exception to the FAA, recently 
came within one vote of abolishing it because it is “‘unique,’ and ‘restricted’ 
to the field of arbitration.”254 
Not coincidentally, in the last two years, some courts have ordered 
arbitration of claims that have little to do with the container contract.255 For 
example, in 2018, the Eighth Circuit enforced infinite language in Parm v. 
Bluestem Brands, Inc.256 Bluestem, an online retailer, allows shoppers to buy 
goods with credit accounts that are serviced by a bank.257 The relationship 
between the bank and its borrowers is governed by a separate contract that 
mandates arbitration for any claim involving “the actions of yourself, us or 
third parties.”258 When a class of plaintiffs contended that Bluestem had 
charged illegal fees, Bluestem argued that it was entitled to enforce the 
arbitration provision in the standalone agreement between the plaintiffs and 
 
251 Valued Servs. of Ky., LLC v. Watkins, 309 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009); see also 
Jiffy Lube, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 1262-63. 
252 Wexler v. AT & T Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 500, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
253 Jiffy Lube, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
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133 (S.C. 2016). 
255 See, e.g., Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 
2017) (requiring arbitration of employee’s claims of sexual assault); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 67–69. 
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the bank.259 The plaintiffs protested that this interpretation would breed 
bizarre results, such as mandating arbitration for “a car accident between a 
consumer and . . . the third-party courier who delivers the [Bluestem] 
packages, or . . . a situation where a lender’s employee sexually harassed 
another employee and the latter had a credit account subject to the 
agreement.”260 The Eighth Circuit was not persuaded, reasoning that “[t]he 
glaring issue with these hypotheticals is that they in no way inform the 
question before the court.”261 Thus, perhaps feeling pressure from the Court, 
the appellate panel launched a counteroffensive to the opinions that have 
rattled off the perverse consequences of ultra-broad arbitration agreements. 
b. Delegation 
As noted above, a delegation clause permits the arbitrator to decide 
whether a claim falls within the scope of a valid agreement to arbitrate.262 
The Court has recently laid the foundation for the widespread use of these 
provisions. First, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, Rent-A-Center, a 
furniture leasing company, required its workers to sign an arbitration 
agreement that gave the arbitrator the exclusive power to resolve disputes 
about its “interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation.”263 
Antonio Jackson, a former employee, sued Rent-A-Center for 
discrimination.264 What followed was a veritable badminton match. Rent-A-
Center moved to compel arbitration.265 Jackson responded by arguing that 
the “arbitration agreement as a whole” was unconscionable because it limited 
discovery and required him to pay half of the arbitrator’s fees.266 And Rent-
A-Center volleyed back by asking the court to enforce the delegation clause 
and allow the arbitrator to decide Jackson’s unconscionability challenge.267 
The Court held that Jackson needed to arbitrate the very issue of whether 
the agreement to arbitrate his lawsuit was binding.268 The Justices relied heavily 
on the initial portion of § 2, which makes “[a] written provision . . . to settle by 
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668 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 633 
arbitration a controversy . . . valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”269 In a pivotal 
maneuver, the Court reasoned that a delegation clause is its own self-contained 
“written [arbitration] provision” within the meaning of the statute: 
The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues 
concerning the arbitration agreement . . . . An agreement to arbitrate a 
gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking 
arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this 
additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.270 
In turn, the view that delegation provisions are sovereign arbitration 
clauses doomed Jackson’s efforts to remain in court.271 Jackson had only 
asserted that the agreement to arbitrate his substantive claims was 
unconscionable.272 As a result, he had waived his right to contend that the 
delegation clause—a separate agreement to arbitrate whether he had agreed to 
arbitrate his substantive claims—was tainted.273 
Rent-A-Center created additional incentives for drafters to use infinite 
clauses. As noted previously, courts had traditionally refused to permit 
arbitrators to entertain “wholly groundless” arguments that an arbitration 
clause encompassed a particular claim.274 But the double-barreled combination 
of delegation provisions and infinite language seemed to eliminate this 
exception. After all, how could a defendant’s argument that an agreement to 
arbitrate “all disputes” applies to a particular claim be “wholly groundless”? 
Nevertheless, in Douglas v. Regions Bank, the Fifth Circuit applied the 
“wholly groundless” exception to an infinite clause.275 The facts of Douglas are 
hard to believe. In 2002, Shirley Douglas opened a checking account with Union 
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Planters Bank.276 Her agreement with the institution contained a delegation 
clause and an arbitration provision that covered “the relationships . . . resulting 
from this [a]greement” and included a survival clause.277 Less than a year later, 
Douglas closed her account.278 In 2005, Union merged with Regions Bank.279 In 
2007, Douglas was injured in a car accident, filed a tort claim, and received a 
settlement.280 In 2010, one of Douglas’s lawyers deposited the proceeds into his 
client trust account—which happened to be at Regions—and then stole it.281 
Douglas sued Regions for negligently failing to prevent the crime.282 
Regions moved to compel arbitration under Douglas’s 2002 signature card 
with Union Planters.283 Douglas responded that her lawsuit against Regions 
did “not touch the Union Planters account in any way or relate back to her 
Union Planters account” that had ended nearly a decade ago.284 But Regions 
replied that the delegation clause in Douglas’s Union Planters contract 
expressly assigned matters of “scope” to the arbitrator.285 
Two members of a Fifth Circuit panel rejected Regions’ argument as 
“wholly groundless.”286 Judge Smith and Higginsons explained that no 
reasonable arbitrator could find a link between Douglas’s negligence claim 
against Regions and her 2002 checking account with Union Planters.287 As 
the majority saw it, “the events leading to Douglas’s claim—a car accident, a 
settlement, and embezzlement of the funds through an account that a third 
party held with the bank—have nothing to do with her checking account 
opened years earlier for only a brief time.”288 
But not everybody agreed. The opinion provoked a strong dissent from 
Judge Dennis, who cautioned that “the ‘wholly groundless’ test appears to be 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent.”289 On cue, in 2017, the Tenth and 
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Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings, Douglas v. Regions Bank, 2012 WL 5400040 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 
5, 2012) (No. 12-00523). 
277 Douglas, 757 F.3d at 465 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
278 Regions Bank’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings at 1, Douglas, 2012 
WL 5400040 (No. 12-00523). 





284 Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Authorities, supra note 276, at 9. 
285 Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note 278, at 3. 
286 Douglas, 757 F.3d at 464. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 468 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
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Eleventh Circuits cited similar concerns to “decline to adopt the ‘wholly 
groundless’ approach.”290 
On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court resolved this dissensus with Henry 
Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.291 Archer and White sued Henry Schein 
for antitrust violations, seeking damages and an injunction.292 However, Archer 
and White’s claims were subject to a delegation clause293 and an arbitration 
provision that exempted “actions seeking injunctive relief.”294 The Fifth Circuit 
refused to allow the arbitrator to decide scope arbitrability, holding that “[w]e 
see no plausible argument that the arbitration clause applies here to an ‘action 
seeking injunctive relief.’”295 Speaking through Justice Kavanaugh, the Court 
reversed.296 Justice Kavanaugh relied heavily on the text of the FAA, which 
“does not contain a ‘wholly groundless’ exception.”297 Also, he expressed 
concern about the amorphousness of the rule, warning that it “would inevitably 
spark collateral litigation (with briefing, argument, and opinion writing) over 
whether a seemingly unmeritorious argument for arbitration is wholly 
groundless, as opposed to groundless.”298 Thus, the Court abolished the 
venerable “wholly groundless” exception to arbitration about arbitration. 
II. REGULATING INFINITE CLAUSES 
Part I established that the widespread use of infinite clauses and 
delegation provisions are amplifying the discord of scope arbitrability. 
Accordingly, this Part offers a blueprint for the many courts that are now (or 
soon will be) grappling with limitless commitments to arbitrate. It argues that 
 
290 Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1286 (10th Cir. 2017); Jones v. Waffle House, 866 
F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2017) (“We join the Tenth Circuit in declining to adopt what has come to 
be known as the wholly groundless exception.”). 
291 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019). 
292 Id. at 526. 
293 The container contract did not include an express delegation clause; instead, it merely 
incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Id.; cf. supra note 189 and 
accompanying text (explaining how courts have construed this language to empower the arbitrator to 
decide arbitrability). 
294 Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2017), vacated, 
139 S. Ct. 524 (2019). Archer and White originally sued Pelton and Crane, which was Henry Schein’s 
predecessor-in-interest. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019). 
The magistrate judge who first heard the case allowed Henry Schein to compel arbitration under 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., No. 12-0572, 
2013 WL 12155243, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. May 28, 2013), vacated on reconsideration, 2016 WL 7157421 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 7, 2016), aff ’d, 878 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019). The district 
court that reviewed the magistrate’s order did not rule on this issue, which meant that it was not 
before the Court. Henry Schein, 2016 WL 7157421, at *9. 
295 Henry Schein, 878 F.3d at 497. 
296 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 528. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. at 531. 
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even after Concepcion, DIRECTV, Rent-A-Center, and Henry Schein, judges can 
continue to nullify some infinite arbitration clauses and delegation 
provisions. It brings these insights to bear on several nasty splits in authority, 
such as the status of nonparties, FAA preemption, survival, and the boundary 
between arbitral and judicial power. 
A. The Limits of Infinite Language 
This Section explains why infinite language is not always enforceable. It 
demonstrates that boundless arbitration clauses can suffer from two defects. 
The first arises from what I call “agreement challenges.” In these cases, the 
plaintiff argues that she either has not assented to the container contract, or 
has not assented to arbitrate with a particular defendant, or has not assented 
to arbitrate for the rest of her life. Although companies have tried to 
anticipate these objections through creative draftsmanship, they cannot 
overcome the bedrock principle that “[i]f a party has not agreed to arbitrate, 
the courts have no authority to mandate that he do so.”299 
In a second group of disputes, which I call “scope challenges,” the plaintiff 
admits that she has agreed to arbitrate with the defendant, but asserts that her 
allegations do not fall within the ambit of the arbitration clause. In this 
milieu, I contend that certain claims are so detached from the container 
contract that § 2 of the FAA does not apply to them. 
1. Agreement Challenges 
One reason courts can refuse to enforce infinite language is simple: the 
plaintiff has not assented to arbitrate. It is well established that “a party 
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 
agreed so to submit.”300 Some infinite clauses violate this maxim by 
attempting to manufacture the indispensable element of contractual consent. 
The clearest example of corporations trying to conjure assent out of thin 
air involves nonsignatory plaintiffs. In general, “only the parties who enter 
into a contract have rights and obligations under that contract . . . .”301 
However, the FAA absorbs “‘traditional principles’ of state law [that] allow a 
contract to be enforced by or against nonparties.”302 For example, the third 
party beneficiary doctrine binds a nonsignatory to an arbitration clause if the 
 
299 Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999). 
300 AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (citation omitted). 
301 Pinnacle Health Facilities XXXIII, LP v. Crecca, No. 15-01062, 2016 WL 9818326, at *10 
(D.N.M. Nov. 7, 2016). 
302 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (quoting 21 R. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 183 (4th ed. 2001)). 
672 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 633 
parties “intended, upon execution of the contract, to bestow a direct, as 
opposed to incidental[,] benefit upon [the party].”303 For this to occur, the 
agreement must either clearly showcase the parties’ intent to benefit the 
nonsignatory304 or advance her interests in some tangible way.305 
As several courts have recognized, drafters should not be able to satisfy this 
test simply by declaring their desire to bind vast, open-ended groups of 
individuals. For example, wireless, cable, and Internet service providers mandate 
arbitration not just for the account holder, but for all “users”306 or anyone who 
operates one of the provider’s devices.307 Yet as a federal judge in Missouri 
recently found, these oblique references do not prove that the contractual 
partners truly meant to confer benefits on numerous unnamed third parties.308 
Likewise, recall that hospitals, nursing homes, and employers in risky industries 
have extended the duty to arbitrate to a signatory’s “parent, spouse, sibling, 
child, guardian, executor, legal representative, administrator or heirs.”309 Courts 
in jurisdictions that treat wrongful death claims as independent have ignored 
this language.310 As the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained, the mere fact 
that a contract says that a nonparty is bound does not make it true: 
 
303 Daphne Auto., LLC v. E. Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc., 245 So. 3d 599, 604 (Ala. 2017) 
(quoting Custom Performance, Inc. v. Dawson, 57 So. 3d 90, 97 (Ala. 2010)). Companies also often 
use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to try to bind nonsignatory plaintiffs. That rule applies 
“when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely on the terms 
of the . . . agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.” Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. 
Long, 453 F.3d 623, 627-28 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brantley v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 424 
F.3d 392, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2005)). Because equitable estoppel is rooted in the plaintiffs’ conduct—
not the text of the contract—it is not relevant for my purposes. 
304 See Tucker v. Vincent, 471 S.W.3d 787, 796 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“To be bound as a third-
party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to benefit that party . . . .”). 
Although “[t]he absence of the third party’s name from the contract is not fatal . . . the record must 
provide evidence that the party’s identity was ascertainable from either the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances surrounding its creation.” Sakyi v. Estee Lauder Cos., 308 F. Supp. 3d 366, 384 
(D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
305 See, e.g., Suh v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 594 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 
the plaintiffs were not third party beneficiaries because “[t]here is no evidence . . . that plaintiffs 
actually derived any benefits” from the contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 302, cmt. a, Reporter’s Notes (instructing courts to “consider the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction as well as the actual language of the contract”). 
306 Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, XFINITY, https://www.xfinity.com/corporate/ 
customers/policies/subscriberagreement [https://perma.cc/QE4L-4724] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); 
Cricket Wireless Terms and Conditions of Service, CRICKET, https://www.cricketwireless.com/terms 
[https://perma.cc/BAT2-3VE3] (last updated Aug. 11, 2019). 
307 E.g., Sprint Terms and Conditions, supra note 174. 
308 See James Shackelford Heating & Cooling, LC v. AT&T Corp., No. 17-663, 2017 WL 
6813715, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2017) (explaining that the mere fact a party derives an incidental 
benefit from a contract does not necessarily make it an intended third party beneficiary). 
309 Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 526 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
310 See supra text accompanying notes 164–165. 
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[A]s interesting as life might be if we could bind one another to contracts 
merely by referring to each other in them, we are not persuaded that a non-
signatory who receives no substantive benefit under a contract may be bound 
to the contract’s procedural provisions, including arbitration clauses, merely 
by being referred to in the contract . . . . Arbitration is a matter of contract, 
however; it is something the contracting parties, or their proxies, must agree 
to. It is not something that one party may simply impose upon another.311 
Indeed, because “nonpart[ies] never agree[] to [a] contract’s terms,” these 
infinite clauses try to generate synthetic consent.312 
The absence of an agreement to arbitrate also explains why the FAA does 
not preempt these holdings. Predictably, firms are citing Concepcion and 
DIRECTV and arguing that § 2 “require[s] arbitration of . . . wrongful-death 
claims.”313 In fact, in March 2018, a district court in Massachusetts opined 
that refusing to enforce arbitration clauses against nonsignatories violates the 
statute because it “has the indirect but practical effect of singling arbitration 
agreements out for special treatment.”314 This logic is flawed. Arbitration 
agreements are just words on a page unless a plaintiff has assented to the 
container contract. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, disputes involving 
nonsignatory plaintiffs are “not about preemption”; rather, they are “about 
consent.”315 Without assent to arbitrate, the FAA never enters the picture. 
The analysis with respect to some nonsignatory defendants is similar. 
Suppose Plaintiff P signs a contract with Entity A that contains an arbitration 
provision. Later, P sues A, Executive B (who works for A), and Firm C (a 
subsidiary of A). In general, because nonparties “cannot enforce [arbitration 
provisions] against one who is a party,”316 B and C must defend P’s lawsuit in 
 
311 Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 599-600 (Ky. 2012); see also Richmond Health 
Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 2016) (“That the Agreement purports to extend to 
wrongful-death claims makes no difference.”); Duenas v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 336 P.3d 763, 
771-72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that “express language in the agreement purporting to bind 
the statutory heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims” is not enforceable (quoting Estate of 
Decamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care & Rehab, Inc., 316 P.3d 607, 614 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2014))); Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 49 (Utah 2008) (“While the intention to bind [the plaintiff] 
is clear, it is less apparent that the obligation to arbitrate was a ‘separate and distinct benefit’ 
bestowed by [the signatories] on her.”). 
312 BML Stage Lighting, Inc. v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 14 S.W.3d 395, 400 (Tex. App. 2000). 
313 Raber v. Emeritus at Marietta, 49 N.E.3d 345, 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); see also, e.g., Brief 
of Appellants at 19, Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-
5062), 2015 WL 2345348; Brief of Appellant at 13, Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 976 N.E.2d 
344 (Ill. 2012) (No. 113204), 2012 WL 8264378. 
314 GGNSC Chestnut Hill LLC v. Schrader, No. 16-10525, 2018 WL 1582555, at *8 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 31, 2018). 
315 Richmond Health Facilities, 811 F.3d at 201. 
316 Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1166, 1167 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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court. After all, P may have agreed to arbitrate with A, but she never agreed 
to arbitrate with B and C. 
The leading exception to this rule is alternative estoppel,317 and businesses 
are increasingly relying on infinite language to try to invoke it.318 Alternative 
estoppel applies when (1) the plaintiff ’s claims are “intertwined” with the 
container contract and (2) a nonsignatory defendant has “a ‘close relationship’ 
with a signatory.”319 One way to satisfy the “close relationship” prong is to show 
that “the non-signatory party is ‘linked textually’ to the underlying contract.”320 
Accordingly, drafters are trying to build “textual[]” bridges to a dizzying array 
of nonparties.321 For example, Citibank’s arbitration agreement covers “[c]laims 
made . . . against anyone connected with [Citibank].”322 Through Citibank’s 
rewards program and branded cards, the company partners with Amazon, Best 
Buy, ExxonMobil, The Home Depot, L.L. Bean, Jet Blue, Macy’s, Sears, Shell, 
and Virgin Atlantic.323 Thus, at least on paper, a single arbitration clause can 
span enormous sectors of the business world. 
However, deferring to the contractual text would flout “the black letter 
rule that the obligation to arbitrate depends on consent.”324 Indeed, the basis 
for alternative estoppel is a contract “implied in fact”: the conclusion that two 
defendants are so entwined that by agreeing to arbitrate against the signatory, 
the plaintiff tacitly “extend[ed] its agreement to arbitrate to [the 
nonsignatory].”325 It would be a rank fiction to construe the act of opening a 
 
317 Alternative estoppel, a variation of equitable estoppel, is the idea that a plaintiff must 
arbitrate any claim that either (1) relies heavily on the terms of the container contract, Grigson v. 
Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000), or (2) alleges that a nonsignatory 
and a signatory engaged in concerted wrongdoing, Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 
1433 (M.D. Ala. 1997), abrogated by Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002). 
318 Nonsignatories also try to invoke arbitration clauses based on incorporation by reference, 
assumption, agency, alter ego, and third-party beneficiary principles. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 
Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing these as the “theories, arising out of common 
principles of contract and agency law, that may bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements”). 
319 Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 639 (Tex. 2018) (quoting 
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
320 Temple v. Best Rate Holdings LLC, 360 F. Supp.3d 1289, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting 
Choctaw Generation Ltd. P’ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 2001)). A 
“close relationship” also exists if the plaintiff “understood the extent of the non-signatory’s 
involvement with respect to the signatories’ relationship.” Id. 
321 Id. 
322 White v. Sunoco Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 486, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff ’d, 870 F.3d 257 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
323 Consumer Businesses, CITI, https://www.citigroup.com/citi/about/consumer_businesses.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y2YA-3RPK] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); Brian Graham, Citi ThankYou Rewards Program 
Review (Including Transfer Partners!), UPGRADEDPOINTS (July 13, 2019), https://upgradedpoints.com/ 
citi-thankyou-rewards-review/ [https://perma.cc/V4LM-XWLW]. 
324 E. W. Bank v. Bingham, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
325 Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 542 F.3d 354, 361 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Grigson 
v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 533 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting)). 
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line of credit as agreeing to arbitrate against airlines, big box stores, online 
retailers, and oil companies.326 
This insight animates Wexler v. AT & T Corp., one of the most interesting 
contemporary opinions dealing with infinite language.327 In 2008, Dr. Eve 
Wexler went online and signed up for wireless service with AT&T Mobility, 
LLC (“Mobility”).328 Dr. Wexler’s contract included an arbitration clause that 
covered “all disputes and claims” that she might have with Mobility or its 
“affiliates.”329 In 2014, Dr. Wexler began to receive harassing calls and text 
messages from AT&T Corporation (“AT&T Corp.”) related to the account 
of a stranger named Paul MacPherson.330 Dr. Wexler filed a class action suit 
against AT&T Corp. for violating the TCPA.331 AT&T Corp. asked a federal 
judge in New York to compel arbitration under Mobility’s contract because 
the plain meaning of “affiliate” is “[a] corporation that is related to another 
corporation by shareholdings or other means of control,” and both AT&T 
Corp. and Mobility “are wholly-owned subsidiaries of AT&T Inc.”332 The 
court denied the motion, reasoning that Dr. Wexler had not objectively 
manifested an intent to arbitrate with AT&T Corp.: 
Notwithstanding the literal meaning of the clause’s language, no reasonable 
person would think that checking a box accepting the “terms and conditions” 
necessary to obtain cell phone service would obligate them to arbitrate literally 
every possible dispute he or she might have with the service provider, let alone 
all of the affiliates under AT&T Inc.’s corporate umbrella—including those 
who provide services unrelated to cell phone coverage.333 
 
326 See White, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 493 (rejecting a Citibank rewards partner’s attempt to invoke 
the “anyone connected with [Citibank]” language); Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 
S.W.3d 624, 640 (Tex. 2018) (reasoning that alternative estoppel typically applies when there is at 
least “some corporate affiliation between a signatory and nonsignatory, not just a working 
relationship”). But see Moss v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 24 F. Supp. 3d 281, 289-91 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(holding that banks that facilitated illegal payday loans were closely related to the lenders and thus 
could invoke alternative estoppel), motion for relief from judgment granted, 114 F. Supp. 3d 61 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), aff ’d sub nom. Moss v. First Premier Bank, 835 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2016). 
327 211 F. Supp. 3d 500, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
328 Defendant AT&T Corp.’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Compel Arbitration at 1-
2, Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d 500 (No. 15-0686), 2015 WL 5998751 [hereinafter AT&T’s Motion to Compel]. 
329 Id. at 2. 
330 Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 502. 
331 Amended Complaint—Class Action, Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d 500 (No. 15-0686), 2015 
WL 1883842. 
332 AT&T’s Motion to Compel, supra note 328, at 8 & n.7 (quoting Affiliate, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). 
333 Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 504. 
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The reasoning is spot-on. AT&T, Inc. is the parent of a staggering ninety-
eight separate firms, from Ameritech to HBO to Yellowpages.com.334 Thus, 
AT&T Corp.’s theory that Mobility’s arbitration provision “includes all 
members of the AT&T corporate family”335 stretches “agreeing” to arbitrate 
past the breaking point. 
Finally, survival provisions raise questions about the duration of the 
plaintiff ’s consent to arbitrate. So far, courts have uniformly enforced arbitral 
survival clauses. Even if the plaintiff sues for wrongdoing that occurred after the 
agreement expired, the existence of survivorship language has been 
dispositive.336 For example, in Townsend v. Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc., Kim 
Townsend entered into a two-year employment contract with Pinnacle, a casino, 
in April 2007.337 The contract included an arbitration clause that stated that it 
“shall survive the expiration of this Agreement.”338 After the contract lapsed in 
April 2009, Townsend continued to work for Pinnacle.339 In November 2009, 
Pinnacle dismissed Townsend, and she sued for wrongful termination.340 The 
Third Circuit sent her claim to arbitration, explaining that the survival provision 
“evidences the intent of the parties to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the 
employment relationship between Ms. Townsend and Pinnacle, not simply 
those which arise during the term of the 2007 Agreement.”341 
 
334 Stephen Johnson, 98 Companies AT&T-Time Warner Will Own After the $85 Billion Merger, 
BIG THINK (June 13, 2018), https://bigthink.com/stephen-johnson/here-are-all-the-companies-att-
time-warner-will-own-after-the-merger-2 [https://perma.cc/7PRP-7Y2D]. 
335 Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 504; accord Revitch v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 18-01127, 2018 WL 
4030550, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2018) (rejecting DirecTV’s attempt to invoke Mobility’s 
arbitration clause as one of Mobility’s “affiliate[s]” because the parties “did not intend to enter into 
an agreement that would cover the claim asserted against DirecTV in this action”). 
336 See Crooks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 312 F. Supp. 3d 932, 938 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (“[B]y its 
express terms, even if the Contract was terminated as a result of Plaintiff ’s bankruptcy discharge, the 
arbitration provision survives.”); Wiitanen v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 17-534, 2017 WL 7035757, 
at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2017) (compelling arbitration of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim 
that allegedly arose after the termination of a credit agreement “because the arbitration provision 
contains an explicit survival clause”); Treinish v. BorrowersFirst, Inc., No. 17-1371, 2017 WL 3971854, 
at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2017) (ordering arbitration of TCPA and state consumer protection claims 
“because the arbitration provision survives any alleged termination and compels Plaintiff to 
arbitrate”). However, the absence of an arbitration-specific survival provision does not always exempt 
a plaintiff ’s post-expiration claims from arbitration. See Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 398 
(6th Cir. 2014) (compelling arbitration even though arbitration was not mentioned as a duty that 
survived the termination of the agreement). But see Stevens-Bratton v. TruGreen, Inc, 675 F. App’x 
563, 570-71 (6th Cir. 2017) (relying in part on the absence of survival clause to hold that plaintiff ’s 
TCPA claim based on post-expiration phone calls did not “arise under the contract”). 




341 Id. Confusingly, courts sometimes rely on survivorship language even when the plaintiff ’s 
claim arises out of a lapsed container contract. For example, in Milfort v. Comcast Cable 
Communications Management LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1272-73 (S.D. Fla. 2018), the court 
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Despite this island of doctrinal calm, trouble lurks on the horizon. All of 
the decisions that have enforced survival provisions have involved 
wrongdoing that occurred shortly after the container contract ended. 
Townsend is pretty typical: Pinnacle fired Townsend just seven months after 
their formal employment contract expired.342 Arguably, Townsend should 
have expected that her arbitration commitment would have lasted that long. 
Nevertheless, now that survival provisions have become common, defendants 
will likely start trying to compel arbitration of claims that stem from conduct 
that takes place many years—perhaps even decades—after the conclusion of 
the container contract. 
Allowing a single line of text in an adhesion contract to waive an 
individual’s right to access the courts forever would do violence to the tenet 
that arbitration is consensual. Indeed, the common law has long bent over 
backwards to deem seemingly-perpetual contracts to be terminable within a 
reasonable time.343 As the Mississippi Supreme Court explained in 1876, this 
approach helps square the language of the agreement with what the parties 
truly intended: 
[C]ontracts . . . will not be enforced as imposing an eternal and never-ending 
burden. An agreement to furnish a support or service, or a particular 
commodity, at a specified price, or to do a certain thing without specification 
as to time, will be construed either as terminable at pleasure, or as implying 
that the thing to be done shall be performed within a reasonable time, and 
the obligation will cease within the same limitation. Any other theory than 
this would subject incautious persons—a class, it may be remarked, which 
includes the majority of mankind—into life-long servitudes . . . .344 
 
compelled arbitration of plaintiff ’s allegations that the defendant illegally accessed his credit report 
when he signed up for cable service. The court held that it did not matter that the plaintiff had 
cancelled his account before he filed the lawsuit because “the Subscriber Agreement contains a 
survivability clause.” Id. However, the survival provision should have been irrelevant. Because the 
dispute involved “facts and occurrences that arose before expiration,” it arose under the container 
contract and should have been arbitrable even without a survivorship clause. Litton Fin. Printing 
Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 166–167. 
342 Townsend, 457 F. App’x at 206. 
343 See, e.g., Killearn Props., Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 366 So. 2d 172, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979) (holding that the contract “was for an indefinite period but not perpetual” and was “terminable 
within a reasonable time”); Rico Indus., Inc. v. TLC Grp., Inc., 6 N.E.3d 415, 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2014) (“[P]erpetual contracts are contrary to public policy.”); Glacial Plains Coop. v. Chippewa 
Valley Ethanol Co., 912 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn. 2018) (“A contract of indefinite duration is 
terminable at will upon reasonable notice to the other party after a reasonable time has passed.”); 
MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family Tr., 864 N.W.2d 83, 92-93 (Wis. 2015) 
(“We are ‘reluctant to interpret a contract as providing for a perpetual contractual right unless the 
intention of the contracting parties to provide for the same is clearly stated.’” (quoting Capital Invs., 
Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., 280 N.W.2d 254 (Wis. 1979))). 
344 Echols v. New Orleans, Jackson & Great N. R.R. Co., 52 Miss. 610, 614 (1876). 
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Although sophisticated parties in negotiated deals can override this 
presumption by using “clear and unequivocal terms,”345 no authority suggests 
that fine print can generate this robust form of assent. And in any event, most 
arbitral survivorship provisions do not unambiguously purport to be perpetual. 
They state only that the obligation to arbitrate “survives” the container 
contract, not that it survives until the bitter end of the world.346 Thus, courts 
should conclude that forced arbitration clauses have an implicit shelf life.347 
2. Scope Challenges 
 As noted, in other disputes over infinite language, there is no doubt that 
the plaintiff entered into an operative agreement to arbitrate against all 
relevant parties, but it is unclear whether this agreement is broad enough to 
cover a specific claim.348 Counterintuitively, this Section argues that the 
primary check on corporate power in this sphere is the text of the FAA. 
Because infinite provisions often exceed the foundation laid by Congress, 
scope challenges are primarily governed by state law. 
Section 2—the statute’s centerpiece—contains an important limit: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.349 
As the italicized words reveal, the statute only governs agreements to 
arbitrate “controvers[ies] . . . arising out of [the container] contract.”350 In turn, 
“to arise” has long been understood as “[t]o originate; to stem (from) . . . [or] 
[t]o result (from).”351 However, infinite arbitration clauses purport to cover 
 
345 Wyo. Valley W. Sch. Dist. v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 695 A.2d 949, 953 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); see 
also Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. H & R Block, 96 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A] 
contract will not be construed to confer a right or impose an obligation in perpetuity unless the 
language of the contract compels such construction.”). 
346 See supra text accompanying notes 186–187. 
347 Cf. Ashbury Heights Capital, LLC v. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., No. 145806, 2016 WL 
4368146, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2016) (holding that the defendant’s argument that “the parties 
are perpetually bound to arbitrate any dispute” is “untenable and surely does not reflect the original 
intent of the parties”). 
348 See supra Section II.A. 
349 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (emphasis added). 
350 Id. 
351 Arise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, 
Inc., 506 F.2d 410, 414 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The term ‘arising out of ’ is ordinarily understood to mean 
originating from, incident to, or connected with the item in question.”); Friedman, supra note 50, at 
1037-39 (providing more detail about the distinction between “arising out of” and “relating to”). 
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allegations without regard to whether they flow from the container contract. 
Indeed, they attempt to suck into their maw all causes of action—no matter 
their source. Because § 2 requires that a claim “arise[s] out of” the container 
contract, it does not apply to the infinite portions of these clauses. I will refer 
to this as the “contractual nexus” theory. 
Section 2’s requirement of a contractual nexus was a deliberate choice. The 
FAA was modeled on arbitration statutes that New York and New Jersey 
passed in the early 1920s.352 Section 2 of the FAA thus mirrored the 
corresponding provisions of these state laws with one striking exception. New 
York’s legislation validated agreements to arbitrate any cause of action “arising 
between the parties to the contract.”353 Conversely, policymakers in New Jersey 
established two rules: they made predispute arbitration clauses enforceable to 
cover lawsuits “arising out the contract,” but permitted parties to submit 
existing claims to arbitration for “the violation of any . . . obligation.”354 Thus, 
New York’s entire statute and New Jersey’s approach to post-dispute 
agreements allowed infinite clauses. Indeed, even if a complaint bore no 
relationship to the container contract, it nevertheless was a controversy 
“arising between the parties to the contract” and sought redress for “the 
violation of any . . . obligation.” However, Congress decided not to go down 
this route. Instead, it chose the narrowest of the three options by following 
New Jersey’s approach to predispute clauses and requiring that a claim “aris[e] 
out of [the container] contract.”355 
The FAA’s drafting history also bolsters the contractual nexus theory. In 
January 1924, the Joint Committee of the Subcommittees on the Judiciary of the 
House and Senate debated a different version of § 2, which provided: 
A written provision in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
between the parties out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.356 
This version of the FAA would have governed arbitration agreements to 
arbitrate claims that arose not only from the container contract, but also from 
“any . . . transaction.” The word “transaction” is “broader than ‘contact’” 
 
352 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924); IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 42-
43 (1992). 
353 In re Shima & Co., 186 N.Y.S. 154, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (quoting Arbitration Law, ch. 275, 
§ 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 5, 8). 
354 Act of Mar. 21, 1923, ch. 134, § 1, 1923 N.J. Laws 291, 291 (emphasis added). 
355 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
356 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the 
Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 2 (1924) (emphasis added). 
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because it “is synonymous with ‘act,’ ‘action,’ ‘affair,’ ‘business,’ and the like.”357 
As a result, a “[c]ontract is a transaction, but a transaction is not necessarily 
a contract.”358 Thus, if the January 1924 draft had passed, § 2 would have 
covered agreements to arbitrate claims that emerged from the sprawling 
universe of the parties’ relationship, rather than the narrower subject matter 
of the container contract.359 But Congress ultimately deleted the phrase 
“transaction involving commerce,” confining the FAA to agreements to 
arbitrate claims “arising . . . out of . . . a [container] contract.”360 
There are two powerful counterarguments to the contractual nexus theory. 
First, there is tension between the theory and settled law. Although the Court 
has never grappled with the “arising out of” language in § 2, it has instructed 
lower courts to err on the side of sending disputes to the private forum.361 
Thus, as noted, courts often hold that broad arbitration clauses cover lawsuits 
that merely “relate to,” rather than “aris[e] out of,” the container contract.362 
“Relate to” encompasses slightly more territory than “aris[e] out of”: it means 
“to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or 
connection with.”363 For example, violations of antitrust and workplace 
discrimination laws “relate to” but do not necessarily “aris[e] out of” the 
container contract. Each allegation hinges on conduct that is far removed from 
the agreement, such as a conspiracy to fix prices or a prejudiced employment 
decision. The fact that these claims are arbitrable although they only brush up 
against the terms of the deal seems to belie my thesis. 
 
357 Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 109 A. 743, 744 (N.J. Ct. Err. & 
App. 1920). 
358 Id. 
359 Eagled-eyed readers may note that the FAA validates agreements in “any maritime 
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). Based on the 
italicized text, one might argue that the statute does, in fact, apply to arbitration clauses in 
“transaction[s]”—not just “contract[s].” However, the word “transaction” refers back to the earlier 
mention of “maritime transaction[s].” See Friedman, supra note 50, at 1041-44. Thus, § 2 ultimately 
insists that a claim “aris[e] out of ” the container contract. 
360 9 U.S.C. § 2. Congress likely removed the phrase “transaction involving commerce” 
because the January 1924 draft attempted to regulate “contracts” that did not “involve [interstate] 
commerce,” which would have exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. See Agostini 
Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1944) (“[I]t was realized that Congress 
had no power to legislate with respect to the validity of contracts generally but only as to the validity 
of those which related to matters subject to its control,” namely those contracts that “cover only 
maritime transactions and transactions involving interstate and foreign commerce.”). 
361 See supra text accompanying notes 120–123. 
362 See supra text accompanying notes 150–154. 
363 Relate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); see also Friedman, supra note 50, at 1037-
40 (observing that the FAA uses the phrase “relating to” elsewhere “to essentially mean ‘having 
something to do with’”). 
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Second, one might justify glossing over the FAA’s text on the grounds 
that it prevents claim-splitting. Courts have long interpreted arbitration 
clauses expansively to minimize the burden on the parties. Where two claims 
share a common factual nucleus, rigidly following Congress’s blueprint could 
slice cases in half.364 Indeed, allegations that “arise out of” the container 
contract would be arbitrated, while those that merely “relate to” the 
agreement would proceed in the judicial system. Sending the entire dispute 
to arbitration avoids this inefficient result. 
Nevertheless, it is one thing to blur the definition of words in a statute 
and another thing to ignore them entirely. There is a thin line between “aris[e] 
out of” and “relate to,” but there is a chasm between “aris[e] out of” and 
“unrelated to.” Accordingly, broad arbitration clauses have a plausible textual 
hook in § 2, whereas infinite provisions do not.365 
In addition, courts implicitly acknowledge that § 2’s authority diminishes 
as the gap between the lawsuit and the container contract widens. As noted, 
when judges apply the “touch matters” or “significant relationship” tests, 
they liberally invoke doctrines such as unconscionability, reasonable 
expectations, and contra proferentem.366 The fact that state law plays an 
outsized role in this sphere suggests that the FAA’s power fades when a claim 
only “relates to” the agreement. 
Finally, policy considerations cut both ways. Recognizing that infinite 
clauses exceed the scope of § 2 would not mean that they are unenforceable. 
Instead, it would empower state law to control the issue. Most jurisdictions have 
 
364 Miletic v. Holm & Wonsild, 294 F. Supp. 772, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“Unless the claims are 
resolved by one tribunal, the parties will be put to the expense and duplication occasioned by 
arbitration of one claim before one tribunal and trial of the other in this Court.”). Similarly, even 
before the FAA, courts cited pragmatic concerns to construe submissions to arbitration broadly. See 
supra text accompanying notes 92–95. 
365 Admittedly, there is another way in which the contractual nexus theory does not map on neatly 
to settled law. Parties sometimes sign multiple contracts at the same time, only one of which contains an 
arbitration clause. Yet courts generally hold that the arbitration provision governs disputes related not 
just to the container contract, but to one of the non-container contracts. See, e.g., Woodville Enter., LLC 
v. Kokosing Materials, Inc., 94 N.E.3d 1053, 1057-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (finding that arbitration clause 
in one agreement also applied to other contracts involved in the dispute). However, this is not fatal to 
the contractual nexus theory. For one, under the common law, “[d]ocuments ‘pertaining to the same 
transaction may be read together,’ even if they are executed at different times and do not reference each 
other, and ‘courts may construe all the documents as if they were part of a single, unified instrument.’” 
In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort 
Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 840 (Tex. 2000)). Thus, there is no bright-line distinction between multiple related 
contracts. In addition, cases that apply the arbitration provision in one agreement to a claim related to a 
related agreement can be understood as a soft-focused view of the “contract” that a dispute must “aris[e] 
out of” under § 2. Just as courts have construed “aris[e] out of” to include “created to,” they have stretched 
“contract” to include several agreements that are intertwined in “one overall transaction.” Nestle Waters 
N. Am., Inc. v. Bollman, 505 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2007). 
366 See supra text accompanying notes 124–128. 
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copied New York’s trailblazing arbitration legislation and have passed statutes 
that validate predispute agreements to arbitrate “any controversy . . . between 
the parties.”367 Thus, even if § 2 of the FAA does not apply, state arbitration 
legislation can provide the infrastructure to enforce infinite language. Whether 
state courts and policymakers decide to honor infinite provisions or strike them 
down, the contractual nexus theory would allow them to speak in a field where 
their voices are often silenced. 
To summarize, scope challenges fall into one of three tiers. First, some 
claims flow from the formation, interpretation, or performance of the 
container contract. These allegations trigger § 2 and are subject to the full 
force of the FAA. Second, other causes of action are indirectly connected to 
the parties’ agreement. Although Congress did not intend the FAA to govern 
these complaints, the Court’s muscular interpretation of the statute has 
extended it into this sphere. However, because the FAA applies only in 
diluted form when causes of action relate indirectly to the parties’ contract, 
it leaves room for courts to invoke contrary principles from state contract law. 
367 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-408 (2019); IDAHO 
CODE § 7-901 (2019); IND. CODE § 34-57-2-1 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (2019); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 1 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.465 (2019); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7303 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-1 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5652 (2019); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.01 (2019). Admittedly, some state arbitration statutes govern all disputes 
between the parties but also contain idiosyncratic exemptions and therefore do not apply to broad 
arbitration clauses in all contexts. See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2020) (excluding certain health 
care disputes); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (West 2019) (excluding employment agreements and 
certain insurance agreements). For the argument that Congress should amend the FAA to conform 
to these state laws, see Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 104-05 (2006).
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Third, still other lawsuits have no relationship with the parties’ contract. 
These are the disputes that infinite clauses purport to govern. But because 
these provisions exceed the metes and bounds of § 2, judges can ignore the 
constraints of federal law and freely deem them to be unconscionable, 
construe them against the drafter, or find that they exceed the boundaries of 
a consumer’s or employee’s reasonable expectations. 
B. Delegation 
The previous Sections also have important implications for delegation 
clauses. As noted, in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., the Court 
abolished the “wholly groundless” rule, reasoning that “[w]hen the parties’ 
contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must 
respect the parties’ decision as embodied in the contract.”368 This sweeping 
statement appears to give drafters carte blanche to use infinite arbitration clauses 
and delegation provisions to funnel all questions of scope arbitrability to 
arbitrators. But this Section contends that Henry Schein is not as groundbreaking 
as it seems, because some arbitrability issues are inherently nondelegable. 
The distinction between “agreement” and “scope” challenges is the key to 
understanding why Henry Schein only goes so far. Henry Schein involved a 
textbook scope challenge: Archer and White contended that an arbitration 
clause that exempted claims for injunctive relief did not govern an antitrust 
claim that sought an injunction.369 To see why Archer and White needed to 
arbitrate this question, recall that Rent-A-Center held that delegation clauses are 
arbitration clauses within arbitration clauses: contracts to arbitrate whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate the merits of a complaint.370 Under this rubric, a 
plaintiff in a scope challenge (1) denies that she agreed to arbitrate a substantive 
claim, but (2) concedes that she agreed to arbitrate whether she agreed to arbitrate 
this claim. For example, even though Archer and White objected that it did not 
agree to arbitrate a lawsuit that sought injunctive relief, it did not try to persuade 
the Court that (1) it never manifested assent to the delegation clause, (2) Henry 
Schein lacked standing to enforce the delegation clause, or (3) the delegation 
clause had lapsed.371 Thus, because Archer and White did not attack the 
 
368 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019). 
369 Id. 
370 See supra text accompanying notes 263–273. 
371 The fact that Henry Schein was not a signatory to the container contract had dropped out of 
the case before it reached the Court. See supra note 294. In addition, because the agreement only 
incorporated the AAA Rules and did not feature an explicit delegation clause, the Court “express[ed] 
no view about whether the contract at issue in this case in fact delegated the arbitrability question to 
an arbitrator.” Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531; see also supra note 293. On remand, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the parties did not “evince[] a ‘clear and unmistakable’ intent to delegate arbitrability.” Archer & 
White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2019). The court reasoned that the 
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delegation clause, Justice Kavanaugh enforced it, instructing lower courts to 
allow arbitrators to decide even frivolous scope challenges.372 
Critically, however, Henry Schein does not address agreement challenges. 
Cases involving a challenge to the agreement to arbitrate are profoundly 
different than scope challenges. Recall that because arbitration arises from the 
parties’ consent, arbitrators cannot decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate: 
If an arbitrator must determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists 
as to the parties before it, a conundrum arises: “[A]n arbitrator would be put 
in the position of deciding whether he was authorized to decide the parties’ 
dispute, concluding either that he was not authorized, a logical circularity, or 
that he was, and raising himself by his own bootstraps.”373 
For this reason, the FAA “preserves for the courts any claim at all that 
necessarily calls an agreement to arbitrate into question.”374 And that is 
precisely what an agreement challenge to a delegation provision does. 
Consider nonsignatory plaintiffs. Suppose an individual files a wrongful 
death action and the defendant responds by invoking a delegation clause in its 
contract with the decedent. Even after Henry Schein, a judge in a state that treats 
wrongful death claims as “independent” must disregard the delegation provision 
and decide for itself whether the plaintiff is bound under third party beneficiary 
principles. Unlike a scope challenge, where the plaintiff merely argues “I did not 
agree to arbitrate the merits of that claim,” a nonsignatory plaintiff contends “I did 
not agree to arbitrate anything (including whether I agreed to arbitrate the merits 
of a claim).” Thus, the court must retain jurisdiction to “assure itself that the 
non-signatory has agreed to arbitrate at all.”375 
 
AAA Rules did not come into play because Archer and White requested an injunction, and arbitration 
agreement exempted “actions seeking injunctive relief.” Id. at 277; see also id. at 281 (“The plain language 
incorporates the AAA rules—and therefore delegates arbitrability—for all disputes except those under 
the carve-out.”). 
372 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 529-31. 
373 Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 632 n.21 (Tex. 2018) (quoting 
In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 182, 193 (Tex. 2009) (Hecht, J., dissenting)); cf. VRG 
Linhas Aereas S.A. v. MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P., 717 F.3d 322, 326 n.2 
(2d Cir. 2013) (opining that “whether the parties agreed to arbitrate in the first place is [a question] 
only a court can answer, since in the absence of any arbitration agreement at all, ‘questions of 
arbitrability’ could hardly have been clearly and unmistakably given over to an arbitrator”). 
374 Rau, supra note 101, at 17 (emphasis omitted in part); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 101–102. 
375 WTA Tour, Inc. v. Super Slam Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 3d 390, 399 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also 
Riley v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 61 F. Supp. 3d 92, 98 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]he [c]ourt must still 
determine whether [p]laintiff is estopped from avoiding arbitration, even if the question of arbitrability 
must be submitted to the arbitrator per the language of the loan agreements.”). In fact, even courts in 
jurisdictions that refused to adopt the “wholly groundless” exception for matters of “pure scope” before 
Henry Schein nevertheless recognized that “delegation provision[s] can apply only to those parties who 
 
2020] Infinite Arbitration Clauses 685 
Likewise, although the law is a tangled mess, the same principle should 
extend to nonsignatory defendants. Initially, the First and Second Circuits held 
that nonparties could enforce a delegation clause in another firm’s contract and 
ask the arbitrator to determine whether the nonparty was entitled to compel 
arbitration.376 But those cases featured nonsignatories who truly stood in the 
shoes of the original contracting party: a bankruptcy assignee and a clear-cut 
successor-in-interest.377 Outside of those unique circumstances, a delegation 
provision should not permit an arbitrator to decide whether plaintiffs must 
arbitrate against nonsignatories.378 For one, a plaintiff in such a case denies that 
she agreed to arbitrate any issue with the nonsignatory, including the threshold 
matter of whether she agreed to arbitrate her substantive claims. As a judge in 
the Southern District of New York recently put it: 
To use the delegation clause to demand that arbitrators settle the question of 
who are the parties to the agreement puts the proverbial cart—the question 
of whether the arbitration agreement is valid—before the horse—whether a 
non-signatory has anything to do with a contract it did not clearly sign.379 
Moreover, allowing nonsignatory defendants to capitalize on delegation 
clauses would open the door to a surreal hall of mirrors. No matter how 
attenuated the connection between two entities, any party—from American 
Airlines to Zenith Electronics—could enforce a delegation clause in a different 
 
actually signed the agreement and manifested their desire to arbitrate arbitrability.” SBMH Grp. 
DMCC v. Noadiam USA, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2017). 
376 Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol., Co., 398 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2005); Apollo Computer, Inc. 
v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 470-74 (1st Cir. 1989). 
377 Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Sadagopan, No. 16-2261, 2018 WL 276364, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 3, 2018). 
378 See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 838 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (refusing to allow the arbitrator to decide an  equitable 
estoppel issue); Qpro Inc. v. RTD Quality Servs. USA, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 
(reasoning that “whether a nonsignatory to an arbitration clause may enforce it against a signatory . . . 
[i]s a matter for the court to decide”); First Am. Bulk Carrier Corp. v. Van Ommeren Shipping (USA) 
LLC, 540 F. Supp. 2d 483, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator could not decide whether 
the nonsignatory defendant was a successor-in-interest to the signatory because “there is much to be 
said for determining who are the parties to the arbitration before the arbitrators hear the merits”); In 
re Paragon Offshore PLC, 588 B.R. 735, 753 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) (“[E]ven where express contractual 
language exists to show an intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability, the [c]ourt must consider 
whether the ‘parties’ at issue fall within the scope of the delegation language.”); Elgohary v. Herrera, 
405 S.W.3d 785, 793 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (“[E]vidence of a successor, assigns, or affiliates clause in the 
contract between the signatories is not evidence that the non-signatory intended that an arbitrator 
decide whether the non-signatory was bound under the contract’s provisions about successors.”). But 
see Rainbow Cinemas, LLC v. Consol. Constr. Co. of Ala., 239 So. 3d 569, 577 (Ala. 2017) (allowing 
nonsignatories to enforce delegation clause); cf. Brittania-U Nigeria, Ltd. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 866 
F.3d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 2017) (same). 
379 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Stucco Sys., LLC, 289 F. Supp. 3d 457, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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party’s contract and have the arbitrator decide who belongs in the private 
forum.380 Thus, cases with nonsignatory defendants raise “question[s] of 
‘relational sufficiency’” that are “for the [c]ourt, not the arbitrator, to resolve.381 
Finally, survival issues are also nondelegable. When a plaintiff argues that 
the container contract has expired, she calls into question whether her assent 
to arbitrate any matter whatsoever—both the merits and arbitrability—has 
likewise expired. Even when the underlying agreement includes both a 
survivorship provision and a delegation clause, an arbitrator cannot make this 
call.382 Indeed, survivorship is the kissing cousin of the nonarbitrable issue of 
whether a plaintiff manifested assent to the container contract. Just as only a 
judge can decide whether consent emerged from the ether, only a judge can 
decide whether it evaporated.383 
 
380 Cf. Dental Implants & Biomaterials S.L. v. Keystone Dental, Inc., No. 12-1158, 2012 WL 
12896195, at *3 (D. Minn. July 3, 2012) (“[A defendant] could not, for example, institute arbitration 
against a company with whom it never had a contract at all and then insist that only an arbitrator 
could decide that there was no contract between the two parties.”). 
381 Gerszberg v. Li & Fung (Trading) Ltd., 215 F. Supp. 3d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
382 See N.Y. Dialysis Servs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n, 262 F. Supp. 3d 96, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (“[W]hether the agreement to arbitrate has likewise expired is a pure question of the continued 
operation vel non of the contract itself (as opposed to the scope of the arbitration clause) and hence 
a question . . . left to the courts.”). A federal judge in Minnesota has correctly held that infinite 
language does not change this calculus because it cannot manufacture agreement where it otherwise 
does not exist. See Dental Implants & Biomaterials S.L., 2012 WL 12896195, at *3 n.3 (“The fact that 
the arbitration provision ‘survive[s] any termination or expiration’ of the agreement . . . does not 
mean that any dispute between the parties must for-evermore be arbitrated.” (citation omitted)). 
383 Occasionally, a case features both a matter of “pure scope” and an “agreement challenge.” For 
example, in Tillman v. Hertz Corp., No. 16-4242, 2016 WL 5934094, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2016), Rico 
Tillman’s mother rented a car from Hertz on January 6, 2016 and listed Tillman’s phone number as her 
emergency contact. Tillman then rented vehicles from Hertz on January 18 and January 25, 2016. Id. 
Hertz’s customer agreement mandated arbitration for “any aspect of the relationship or communications 
between us” and also included a delegation provision. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant the 
Hertz Corporation’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Stay 
Pending Arbitration at 3, Tillman, 2016 WL 5934094 (No. 16-4242). Tillman’s mom failed to return her 
car on time, and Hertz made several automated phone calls to Tillman in February. Tillman, 2016 WL 
5934094, at *1. When Tillman sued under the TCPA, Hertz sought to invoke the contracts he had signed 
in mid-January, which Hertz claimed contained an arbitration clause and delegation provision to which 
Tillman had agreed. A federal court in Illinois rejected this request: 
The instant dispute arises not from the contractual relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant, but rather from the contract between plaintiff ’s mother and defendant—a 
contract to which plaintiff was not a party. Therefore, even if plaintiff did enter into 
valid arbitration agreements when he rented cars from defendant, those arbitration 
agreements would not apply to a dispute regarding plaintiff ’s mother’s rental car. 
Id. at *2. Nestled within this reasoning are two separate conclusions: that (1) Tillman was not a party 
to the contract his mother had signed (an “agreement challenge”) and (2) that assuming Tillman had 
agreed to the arbitration clauses in the mid-January rental contracts, those arbitration agreements 
would not apply to a dispute regarding plaintiff ’s mother’s rental car (a matter of “pure scope”). 
Under my thesis, the court would decide the first issue, leaving the second for the arbitrator. 
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Therefore, despite Henry Schein’s categorical statements, courts retain 
jurisdiction over a wide variety of disputes over scope arbitrability. Even the 
one-two punch of the broadest possible delegation and arbitration provisions 
cannot pass the baton to the arbitrator to decide whether a plaintiff agreed to 
arbitrate a matter. Ultimately, contracts cannot validate themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Until recently, an agreement to arbitrate “any claim or controversy arising 
out of or relating to” the container contact was “the very paradigm of a broad 
arbitration clause.”384 But now, through infinite provisions, consumers, 
employees, medical patients, and their relatives are supposedly assenting “to 
arbitrate all claims that could ever arise” against a defendant and its allies.385 
Moreover, companies are trying to use infinite language in tandem with 
delegation clauses to almost completely opt out of the court system—a trend 
that will only accelerate after Henry Schein. 
 
384 Woodville Enter., LLC v. Kokosing Materials, Inc., 94 N.E.3d 1053, 1056-57 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2017) (citation omitted). 
385 Savage v. Citibank, N.A., No. 14-03633, 2015 WL 2214229, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2015). 
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This Article has explained why many of these efforts should fail. First, 
infinite language is not enforceable when it tries to fabricate contractual consent. 
Second, § 2 of the FAA does not provide safe harbor for arbitration provisions 
that govern lawsuits that are disconnected from the parties’ agreement. Third, 
delegation clauses cannot cover questions about whether arbitration clauses 
apply to nonsignatories or last forever. Recognizing these parameters will 
prevent private dispute resolution from becoming a black hole that swallows an 
ever-expanding swath of the civil justice system. 
